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It appeared to me that no private family, composed of half a dozen
members, could subsist a twelvemonth under the governance of
such [judicial] rules [of evidence]: and that were the principles
from which they flow to receive their full effect, the utmost extrava-
gance of Jacobinism would not be more surely fatal to the existence
of society than the sort of dealing, which, in these seats of elaborate
wisdom, calls itself by the name of justice.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the renowned thinker and re-
former, made the observation above in criticizing the restrictive ju-
dicial rules of evidence that defied common sense by excluding
information that could be useful in reaching a decision.  As dis-
cussed below, the statutory law governing evidence in administra-
tive proceedings was designed to ease the admission and use of
relevant evidence from the type of restrictions applied in court pro-
ceedings while still retaining a standard of integrity.  This relaxed
standard, however, is more amorphous than the particularized judi-
cial rules of evidence and presents continuing problems of
application.2
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO EN-
GLISH PRACTICE 6 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827).
2. Commentators have taken differing views on how to address some of the diffi-
culties of the absence of identifiable evidence rules in administrative proceedings.
Some have advocated essentially adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) or
similar rules either to bring more order or to make it more difficult for government
agencies to prevail. See, e.g., Elliot B. Glicksman, The Modern Hearsay Rule Should Find
Administrative Law Application, 78 NEB. L. REV. 135 (1999) (arguing that administrative
proceedings are like non-jury trials, to which the FRE apply, and the application of the
FRE would add integrity and structure to administrative proceedings); Joseph J. Migas,
Admissibility of Hearsay in Administrative Deportation Hearings: a Due Process Call for Reform,
11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601 (1997) (arguing that applying FRE hearsay exclusion rules to
deportation hearings would increase protections for deportable aliens); James L. Rose,
Hearsay in Administrative Agency Adjudications, 6 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 459 (1992) (arguing
that hearsay should be rejected in administrative proceedings if it does not meet re-
quirements of the FRE); Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Admin-
istrative Agency Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 353
(1991) (arguing for the adoption of modified FRE to provide more structure and con-
sistency; author was the Reporter for the Department of Labor Rules of Evidence,
which are a modified version of the FRE).
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At first glance, the statutory law governing evidence, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (“APA”), seems to provide a straightfor-
ward standard of admissibility.  The APA provides that “[a]ny oral
or documentary evidence may be received[.]”3  The only restriction
is that an “agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclu-
sion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.”4  In
other words, only useless evidence is excluded.  Many agencies have
supplemented evidence admission requirements through regula-
tion.5  Some regulations simply echo the APA.6  Some regulations
On the other hand, some commentators have staunchly defended the greatest ad-
missability of evidence without the interference of judicial rules of evidence. See, e.g.,
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 10.1-
10.3, at 117-29 (3d ed. 1994) (distinguishing evidence rules in court proceedings from
those in administrative proceedings); Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Administrative
Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689 (1964) (arguing in an address before hearing
examiners (the former title of administrative law judges (“ALJs”)) that judicial rules of
evidence should not be applied in administrative proceedings because “simple observa-
tion” shows that “technically incompetent evidence is so often more reliable than tech-
nically competent evidence;” the guide should be “the probative effect of the
evidence”); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, (1941) (arguing that because administrative proceedings
have many varying purposes, degrees of formality, and procedural necessity require-
ments, judicial rules of evidence are too rigid to work); Ernest Gelhorn, Rules of Evidence
and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-22 (opining that
deviation from strict judicial rules of evidence is helpful in some circumstances in ad-
ministrative proceedings).
Commentators have generally approached the subject of evidentiary standards
from a fixed point as to whether broad admissibility or the more restrictive judicial rules
of evidence are best.  This article attempts a more fundamental exploration of the ori-
gins and operation of evidence standards in administrative proceedings.  It explores the
history of the struggle between broader admissibility on one hand and tighter and more
structured admission standards on the other and then examines the default standards
that apply constitutionally on broader admission.  It looks at the FRE from the stand-
point of how the FRE complement those standards and could be used in a way that
would help add structure without constraining needed broad admission in many types
of proceedings.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2004).  The APA standards in 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) apply only
to adjudications “required by statue to be determined on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2004). Such statutory requirements are com-
mon, though they do not apply to all administrative proceedings.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
5. Professor Pierce, in the middle 1980s when he was a consultant to the Admin-
istrative Conference (no longer in existence), found that there were 280 regulations
that governed evidence in agency proceedings.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).  Because
there are so many individual agency proceeding variations, the analysis here focuses on
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add exclusionary provisions that are APA decisional or reviewing
court standards, discussed below.7  Some regulations add other
standards, such as what a reasonable person would rely on.8  Many
regulations make references to the Federal Rules of Evidence
(“FRE”).  Usually such regulations expressly exclude the restrictive
application of the FRE.9  Others make some use of the FRE or pro-
vide that if evidence complies with the FRE it shall be admitted.10
decisions of reviewing courts, which have more general application and deal with fun-
damental issues common to all agency proceedings.
6. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (rules for Securities and Exchange Commission
proceedings): “The Commission or the hearing officer may receive relevant evidence
and shall exclude all evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious.”
7. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 10.67 (rules for Commodity Futures Trading Commission
proceedings): “Relevant, material and reliable evidence shall be admitted. Irrelevant,
immaterial, unreliable and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded.”  See infra
notes 83-109 and accompanying text for discussion of the administrative decision and
review standards.
8. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 385.509 (rules for Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
proceedings): “The presiding officer should exclude from evidence any irrelevant, im-
material, or unduly repetitious material. The presiding officer may also exclude from
evidence any other material which the presiding officer determines is not of the kind
which would affect reasonable and fair-minded persons in the conduct of their daily
affairs.” See also 18 C.F.R. § 401.84 (rules for Delaware River Basin Commission pro-
ceedings): “The Hearing Officer shall: . . .. exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly
repetitious evidence, but the interested parties shall not be bound by technical rules of
evidence and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may be received.”
Some regulations add requirements that are not only not in the APA, but are contrary
to the APA, perhaps without awareness, such as referring to “competency,” a term usu-
ally associated with judicial rules of evidence and excluded from the APA during its
drafting. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59 (rules for controlled substances proceedings,
Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice): “The presiding officer shall
admit only evidence that is competent, relevant, material and not unduly repetitious.”
See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text for legislative rejection of court standards
of competency.
9. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 1423.17 (rules for Unfair Labor Practice proceedings, For-
eign Service Labor Relations Board): “The parties shall not be bound by the rules of
evidence, whether statutory, common law, or adopted by court.  Any evidence may be
received, except that an Administration Law Judge may exclude any evidence which is
immaterial, irrelevant, unduly repetitious or customarily privileged.”
10. Some regulations provide that evidence shall not be excluded because of fail-
ure to comply with the FRE, but the FRE may be used to argue as to admissibility. See,
e.g.,  24 C.F.R. § 1724.425 (rules for sales registration proceedings, Housing and Urban
Development Department):
The administrative law judge shall receive relevant and material evidence,
rule upon offers of proof and exclude all irrelevant, immaterial or unduly
repetitious evidence. . . . Evidence shall not be excluded merely by applica-
tion of technical rules governing its admissibility, competency, weight or
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In some cases, the FRE have been adopted as the evidence
standard.11
The APA evidence admission rules are accompanied by re-
lated, express APA standards setting forth the evidence required to
support a final decision after the hearing.  On that point, the APA
provides: “A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued
foundation in the record; but evidence lacking any significant probative
value, or substantially tending merely to confuse or extend the record, shall
be excluded.  The administrative law judge may allow arguments on the
admissibility of evidence by analogy to the Federal Rules of Evidence cur-
rently applicable in the United States District Courts of the United States.
Some regulations utilize specific provisions of the FRE. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.43
(rules for Federal Trade Commission proceedings):
Relevant, material, and reliable evidence shall be admitted. Irrelevant, im-
material, and unreliable evidence shall be excluded. Evidence, even if rele-
vant, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or if the evidence
would be misleading, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The second sentence is taken from Rule 403 of the FRE.
Some regulations provide expressly that evidence that meets the requirements of
the FRE is admissible, but that inadmissibility under the FRE does not exclude admissi-
bility in the proceedings. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 308.36 (rules for Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation proceedings):
Admissibility. (1) Except as is otherwise set forth in this section, relevant,
material, and reliable evidence that is not unduly repetitive is admissible to
the fullest extent authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act and other
applicable law.
(2) Evidence that would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence
is admissible in a proceeding conducted pursuant to this subpart.
(3) Evidence that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence may not be deemed or ruled to be inadmissible in a proceeding con-
ducted pursuant to this subpart if such evidence is relevant, material,
reliable and not unduly repetitive.
11. The Department of Labor has enacted a complete set of rules of evidence
based on the FRE, with modifications of some provisions. See 29 C.F.R. part 18, subpart
B.  In a variation, Congress specifically required the NLRB to apply the judicial rules of
evidence to NRLB proceedings to the extent practicable. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (“Any
such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules
of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil
procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28.”); implemented in 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.39 (“Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under
the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to the act of June 19, 1934, (U.S.C., title
28, §§ 723-B, 723-C).”).
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except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof
cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reli-
able, probative, and substantial evidence.”12  This obviously raises
some questions on admissibility because if evidence cannot be used
for a decision there would seem to be no purpose to admitting it.
The standards are not the same because often it is not possible to
make a final determination about whether evidence will meet deci-
sional standards at the moment it is offered into evidence.13  Thus
the evidence standard for making a decision is not the same as the
standard for admissibility, although there is some relationship.
There also is a judicial review standard that agency decisions must
be supported by “substantial evidence,” discussed below, that neces-
sarily relates to the admission and agency decision evidentiary
standards.14
Another overarching factor is the constitutional standard.  Be-
cause the purpose of the relaxed evidence standard in administra-
tive proceedings is to encourage broad admission of evidence,
12. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
13. For example, a single piece of evidence is unlikely to meet the “substantial”
evidence requirement.  Rather, “substantial” evidence is likely to be formed from an
aggregation of individual pieces of evidence.  Thus, a piece of evidence is not inadmissi-
ble because it is not “substantial” evidence in terms of the decisional standard (al-
though an individual piece of evidence may be so inherently trifling that it is not
“material”).  Similarly, the “reliability” or “probativeness” of a piece of evidence may be
established in part from other pieces of evidence.  A record of a telephone call might,
by itself, not appear probative, but when ultimately combined with testimony and other
documents, it helps form a body of evidence sufficient to support a decision.  Even as to
reliability, a piece of evidence of apparent questionable reliability may ultimately be
corroborated by other evidence and form evidence sufficient to support a decision.
Oral testimony is received without determination as to reliability or probativeness; that
determination is made at the time of a decision.  Thus a witness’s blatantly false or
improbable testimony is received, but it could not constitute evidence to support a
decision.
14. The standard for judicial review with respect to evidence is:
The reviewing court shall . . .
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be . . .
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute . . .
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken
of the rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
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including hearsay, there frequently can be situations where a re-
spondent’s ability to test the evidence, particularly hearsay, may be
lessened so much that he or she is denied due process.  Indeed,
reviewing courts frequently determine specific evidence issues on
constitutional requirements rather than statutory or regulatory
requirements.
This article examines all the factors that apply to the standards
for admission and use of evidence in administrative proceedings.  It
also discusses how the FRE relate to the process.  It explores the
interworkings of the factors and advances a methodology for their
application.
II. EARLY EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
A. Origins of Agency Proceedings
The roots of administrative agencies go back to the beginning
of the United States.15  The Final Report of the Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure, prepared during the de-
bates in the early 1940s leading up to the enactment of the APA,
identifies laws enacted in the first session of the First Congress that
conferred administrative powers for customs collections and veter-
ans benefits.16
At the time of the Final Report in 1941, fifty-one administrative
agencies or offices existed.17  Eleven of the agencies had beginnings
in statutes enacted before the close of the Civil War, including the
Patent Office and, in 1862, the Bureau of Internal Revenue.18  Six
others came into existence from 1865 to the turn of the twentieth
century, including the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”)
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).19  Nine
others came into existence by the end of World War I, including
the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Reserve System,
15. The APA defines “agency” as “an authority of the Government of the United
States.” 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1966).  “Agency” is therefore used here generally to refer to any
federal administrative body even if it is part of an executive department.
16. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1ST SESS. 1941).
17. Id. at 7-8.
18. Id. at 8-9.
19. Id. at 9.
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and the Federal Trade Commission.20  The period from 1918 to
1929 saw the beginning of nine new agencies, including the Federal
Power Commission and the predecessor of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission.21  Seventeen more came into being in the
1930’s, including Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Board, the
National Labor Relations Board, and the Commodity Exchange
Commission.22
Administrative powers have changed significantly over time.
Early administrative powers dealt with basic, relatively straightfor-
ward functions, such as taxes, patents, and veterans’ benefits.  After
the Civil War, as the industrial revolution blossomed, the powers
delegated to administrative agencies began to include regulation of
the economics of business, starting with the ICC in 1887.  Perhaps
because the administrative powers were beginning to affect busi-
ness, with extensive financial impact and complicated economic is-
sues, the question of evidentiary standards became significant.
B. Pre-APA Judicial Development of Administrative Evidence
Standards
It is not surprising that the seminal Supreme Court case on
evidentiary standards in administrative proceedings involved a case
before the first economic regulation agency, the ICC.  In Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird,23 a shipper complained of discrimina-
tory rates on certain rail lines in shipments from Pennsylvania to
the Atlantic Ocean and sought an order from the ICC prohibiting
the discriminatory rates.24  The ICC held hearings on the com-
plaint.25  One of the issues was whether contracts entered into be-
tween the railroads and coal producing companies they essentially
owned showed lower imbedded shipping costs than the complain-
ant could get.26  Witnesses from the coal producing companies re-
ceiving the favored rates appeared when summoned but refused to
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10.
22. See supra REPORT, supra note 16, at 10-11.
23. 194 U.S. 25 (1904).
24. Id. at 26-28.
25. Id. at 28
26. Id. at 41.
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produce their contracts with the railroad companies or to testify
about them.27  The United States circuit court rejected the ICC’s
request for an order requiring production of the documents and
the giving of testimony.28  The Supreme Court reversed,29  holding
that broad concepts apply to the admission of evidence in such ad-
ministrative hearings:
The inquiry of a board of the character of the Interstate
Commerce Commission should not be too narrowly con-
strained by technical rules as to the admissibility of proof.
Its function is largely one of investigation, and it should
not be hampered in making inquiry pertaining to inter-
state commerce by those narrow rules which prevail in tri-
als at common law, where a strict correspondence is
required between allegation and proof.30
In this early Supreme Court foray into evidentiary standards in ad-
ministrative proceedings, the Court was willing to view administra-
tive proceedings as having looser evidence standards than courts.
Later, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of what stan-
dard of judicial review applies to ICC decisions and again com-
mented on evidentiary standards.  In Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,31 the ICC argued that its order that
rates on particular rail lines be rolled back to earlier rates must be
accepted without regard to whether the unfairness of the rates was
formally established at a hearing; that is, the conclusions must be
accepted pretty much as legislative determinations must be ac-
cepted.32  The Court noted, however, that the law provided that
rates may be ordered changed only after a hearing and that a hear-
ing implies basic rights as to evidence.33  The Court noted that
there is greater liberality in the admission of evidence in adminis-
trative proceedings, but that such liberality is still constrained to
meet basic evidentiary requirements:
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id. at 26.
29. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 194 U.S. at 42-44.
30. Id. at 44.
31. 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
32. Id. at 92-93.
33. Id. at 93.
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The Commission is an administrative body and, even
where it acts in a quasi judicial capacity, is not limited by
the strict rules, as to the admissibility of evidence, which
prevail in suits between private parties.  Interstate Com-
merce Comm’n v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25.  But the more lib-
eral the practice in admitting testimony, the more
imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of
evidence by which rights are asserted or defended.  Com-
missioners cannot act upon their own information, as
could jurors in primitive days.  All parties must be fully
apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered,
and must be given opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in ex-
planation or rebuttal.34
Having noted that it would not review the Commission’s conclu-
sions “by passing upon the credibility of witnesses or conflicts in the
testimony,”35 the Court proceeded to review the record to deter-
mine if there was “substantial evidence to support the order.”36
The Court found that the order was sustained by “substantial,
though conflicting evidence,” and since “courts cannot settle the
conflict, nor put their judgments against that of the rate-making
body,” upheld the order.37
In Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.38 the Court
reached the issue of the standard for the underlying quality of evi-
dence admitted.  Shippers petitioned the ICC for a reparations or-
der for overcharges by railroads.39  The ICC held a hearing,
characterized by the Court as “informal,” in which the only witness
was a shipper’s representative who, having prepared the claims, hav-
ing gathered data on the claims from commission agents and ship-
pers, and having examined the books and records of commission
merchants, testified as to the information and the practices of cattle
shippers and commission merchants.40  Voluminous documentary
evidence was received on the claims themselves, and records were
34. Id.
35. Id. at 92.
36. Id. at 94.
37. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 227 U.S. at 100.
38. 253 U.S. 117 (1920).
39. Id. at 122-24.
40. Id. at 129-30.
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submitted during the hearing for review by the accounting offices
of the railroads, with the Court noting that “points in real contro-
versy were few.”41  On this record, the ICC determined that repara-
tions should be paid.42  The statue provided that enforcement of
the order was by suit in a United States District Court.  The shippers
brought such suit and prevailed.43  The defendants then appealed
to the court of appeals, arguing that the record in the ICC hearing
was not adequate to support an order by a court.44  The Court of
Appeals agreed, characterizing the evidence as hearsay.45  Thus the
issue was essentially whether the evidence used for the ICC hearing
had to meet court evidentiary requirements or whether the ICC evi-
dentiary record and order were sufficient.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Ap-
peals had criticized the evidence as being hearsay and agreed that
much of it was.46  The Court noted that the defendants had failed
to object to the hearsay nature of the evidence at the ICC hearing
and thus had lost standing to object at the court level.47  The Court
also noted that the hearsay evidence was corroborated.48  The
Court stated that the use of hearsay evidence was acceptable:
We are not here called upon to consider whether the
Commission may receive and act upon hearsay evidence
seasonably objected to as hearsay: but we do hold that in
this case, where such evidence was introduced without ob-
jection and was substantially corroborated by original evi-
dence clearly admissible against the parties to be affected,
the Commission is not to be regarded as having acted ar-
bitrarily, nor may its findings and order be rejected as
wanting in support, simply because the hearsay evidence
was considered with the rest.49
41. Id. at 127-28.
42. Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 120.
44. Spiller, 253 U.S. at 122.
45. Id. at 122, 129.
46. Id. at 129-30.
47. Id. at 130.
48. Id. at 131-32.
49. Id. at 131.
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The Court cited Interstate Commerce Commission  v. Baird 50 and Inter-
state Commmerce Commission  v. Louisville & Nashville. R. R. Co.51 dis-
cussed above, for the proposition that admissibility of evidence in
administrative proceedings is not limited to the strict rules of evi-
dence in court trials.52  Thus, the Court first reached the issue of
whether particular evidence that did not meet court rules of evi-
dence could be admitted and held that it could, at least in the cir-
cumstances presented.  The Court also held that the underlying
standard for the conduct of administrative proceedings is that the
hearing be fair and any order be supported by substantial evidence,
stating:
These provisions [authorizing the ICC hearings] allow a
large degree of latitude in the investigation of claims for
reparation, and the resulting findings and order of the
commission may not be rejected as evidence because of
any errors in its procedure not amounting to a denial of
the right to a fair hearing, so long as the essential facts
found are based upon substantial evidence.53
Finally, in the last major opinion on evidence standards prior to the
enactment of the APA, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,54 the Court
addressed the evidentiary review standard.  In this case, a court of
appeals had upheld an administrative order on the basis that the
administrative hearing was not “wholly barren of evidence” support-
ing the order.55  The appellants argued that this was insufficient
and also argued that the hearing received “remote hearsay” and
“mere rumor.”56  The statute provided that the factual findings of
the Labor Board shall be conclusive if “supported by evidence.”57
The Court agreed with the appellants that this meant the findings
must be supported by “substantial evidence.”58  The Court defined
substantial evidence as being: “more than a scintilla.  It means such
50. 194 U.S. 25 (1904).
51. 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
52. Spiller, 253 U.S. at 131.
53. Id. at 126.
54. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
55. Id. at 229.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”59 The Court found that the court of appeals
was referring to substantial evidence as supporting the order, and
thus upheld the court of appeals ruling.60
As to the admissibly of evidence, the Court in Consolidated
Edison Co. noted that the authorizing statute provided that “the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.”61  The Court noted that the purpose was to relax the
standard for the admissibility of evidence: “The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order.”62  The Court, however,
stated that the relaxed standard does not extend to permitting deci-
sions to be based on remote and flimsy evidence: “But this assur-
ance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not
go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having ra-
tional probative force.  Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence.”63  Thus, broad admissibil-
ity is permissible, but the evidence on which a decision is rendered
must have “rational probative force.”  In this case, the Court found
that the evidence met the test and rejected the appellants’
argument.
C. The Administrative Procedure Act
1. Early Legislative Reaction to Broad Standards of
Evidence
As reflected in the pre-APA court decisions on administrative
evidence, agencies wanted, indeed needed, broad admissibility.
Particularly on large economic matters, hearsay and other non-ad-
missible forms of evidence had to be considered.  Courts recog-
59. Id.
60. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 229.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 229-30, citing to, among other cases, Interstate Commerce Comm’n v.
Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44 (1904); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913), discussed above.
63. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 230.
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nized this, as in Spiller,64 where establishing rates charged to
shippers would be difficult at best under court evidence rules of the
time.  Of course, the respondents felt they were economically af-
fected by evidentiary standards lower than those required in court.
Certainly, applying court rules of evidence in administrative pro-
ceedings would make defense much easier.  These competing inter-
ests also were reflected in the legislative arena.
The defense bar resisted the informality of the expanding ad-
ministrative processes, in part by seeking “increasingly elaborate,
expensive, and time-consuming procedural formalities to govern
agency decision making.”65  In both the United States and England,
some lawyers decried what they saw as a movement to socialism
through administrative proceedings.66  The establishment of new
agencies during the New Deal created additional bar concerns.  In
1933, the American Bar Association established a special committee
on administrative law.67  In the first of a series of reports, the com-
mittee in 1934 advocated more court-like procedures, stating:
The judicial branch of the federal government is being
rapidly and seriously undermined. . . .  The committee
naturally concludes that, so far as possible, the decision of
controversies of a judicial character must be brought back
into the judicial system.68
During this time, the initial legislative movement under these
influences was directed toward creating a federal administrative
court.69  It was noted, however, that the establishment of a federal
administrative court would be inconsistent with the existence of
general courts that were provided for in the Constitution and with
which the population was familiar.70
64. 253 U.S. 117 (1920)
65. KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 1.4, at 10 (3d. ed. 1994).
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. (quoting 59 A.B.A.R. 539, 549 (1934)).
69. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 7-16 (1946) (providing a detailed history of legis-
lative developments).
70. Id. at 8.
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2. Bar Efforts on Procedure and Government Response
The effort later turned from bringing administrative proceed-
ings into a federal court system to bringing court standards into
administrative proceedings.  The first of the bills addressed to stan-
dards of administrative proceedings was S. 915, introduced in 1939,
in the first session of the 76th Congress.  An identical bill, H.R.
4236 was introduced in the House.  These bills recognized that it
was too late to try to force the adjudicatory process into the federal
court system.71  The bills sought to bring judicial proceeding re-
quirements into the administrative forum by imposing procedures
for appeals within agencies and providing for external imposition
of rules of trial practice and procedure:
Section 6 is complementary to these two sections [4 and
5, on internal appeals process] in the authorization and
request that the Supreme Court of the United States issue
uniform rules of trial practice and procedure for the exer-
cise of the adjudicatory process in the administrative
agencies and for the appellate review.  It is assumed that
in complying with such request the Supreme Court of the
United States will duplicate the procedure followed in for-
mulating uniform rules for the trial courts and appoint an
able committee, consisting of representatives of the ad-
ministrative agencies, members of the bar in private prac-
tice, and others to make the necessary studies and
prepare the rules of trial practice and procedure.72
71. S. REP. NO. 76-442, at 12 (1939).  The Senate report on the legislation stated:
If there ever was a time when the investigational, prosecutorial, and judicial
function exercised by administrative agencies in the administration of stat-
utes could be segregated, that time has long since passed.  The complexities
of modern-day governments necessitate the combination of such functions
in the administrative process, and this is entirely aside from the fact that
the administrative agencies determine many times more controversies
within a given period than do the traditional courts. Even if the courts were
otherwise qualified to exercise de novo the judicial process as to all such
controversies, the number thereof would swamp any judicial system which
we have had in America.
Id.
72. Id. at 13.
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This legislation passed in Congress,73 but the bill was prevented
from becoming law by a veto by President Roosevelt on December
17, 1940.
The President vetoed the bill largely on the ground that the
bill would effectively impose the constraints and costs of court pro-
ceedings in an area where broader reception of evidence at less cost
was essential:
It is impossible to subject the daily routine of fact finding
in many of our agencies to court procedure.  Litigation
has become costly beyond the ability of the average per-
son to bear.  Its technical rules of procedure are often
traps for the unwary and technical rules of evidence often pre-
vent common-sence determinations on information which would
be regarded as adequate for any business decision. . .
* * *
The administrative tribunal or agency has been evolved in
order to handle controversies arising under particular
statutes.  It is characteristic of these tribunals that simple
and nontechnical hearings take the place of court trials
and informal proceedings supersede rigid and formal
pleadings and processes. A common-sense resort to usual and
practical sources of information takes the place of archaic and
technical application of rules of evidence, and an informed
and expert tribunal renders its decisions with an eye that
looks forward to results rather than backward to prece-
dent and to the leading case.74
The President’s veto also was based in part upon his desire to
await a report from a committee appointed by the Attorney General
to study administrative procedure.  This Committee, known as The
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, had
been appointed on February 24, 1939, at the time of the introduc-
tion of the bill that was vetoed.  It was composed of practitioners,
73. The bill was passed in the Senate on May 17, 1939, but became subject to a
motion to reconsider.  A substantially identical House bill, H.R. 6324, was passed in the
House on April 21, 1940.  It was reported in the Senate and passed with technical
amendments on November 26, 1940.  The amendments were agreed to by the House
on November 26, 1940.
74. Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. 76-986 (Dec. 18, 1940)
(emphasis added).
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judges, and professors under the leadership of Walter Gelhorn.75
The Committee staff investigated the procedures at many agencies,
wrote monographs, held public hearings and issued a detailed re-
port.76  The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure, submitted on January 24, 1941,77 echoed
the sentiments in the President’s veto as it applied to evidence.78
The report also began the process of trying to formulate a standard
for evidence to be applied in the absence of the rejected limitations
of the common law rules of evidence.79  The succeeding legislative
history reflects the further exploration of the issue of how to estab-
lish standards for evidence after the abandonment of the restric-
tions of court rules of evidence.  In the meantime, the more urgent
matter of the Second World War brought a three year hiatus to
these developments.
3. Final Compromise on Bifurcated Evidence Standards
in Agency Proceedings
In 1944, work on administrative procedure legislation re-
sumed.  Bills reflecting the ABA positions requiring court rules of
evidence were introduced.80  Although the bills supported by the
ABA were not passed in 1944, they were reintroduced with revisions
in 1945.81  Hearings were held in June 1945 and comments were
received from administrative agencies.82  By October 1945, the lan-
guage of the Senate bill had been changed to provide for broad
75. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 65, at 13.
76. Id.
77. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1st Sess. 1941).
78. Id. at 70.
79. Id. at 71.
80. H.R. 4314, 78th Cong. (1944) was introduced on March 2, 1944.  S. 2030, 78th
Cong. (1944) and H.R. 5081, 78th Cong. (1944) were then introduced in the second
session. H.R. 5237, 78th Cong. (1944) was also introduced in this session to carry out
recommendations of the Select Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies contained
in H.R. REP. NO. 78-1797, 2d Session.
81. They were reintroduced in the first session of the 79th Congress as S. 7 and
H.R. 1203.
82. A committee print correlating the bill, revisions, references to the Attorney
General’s Committee report and a summary of views and proposals was issued in June
1945. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REPORT ON S. 7 (Comm. Print 1945).
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admission of evidence, but with restrictions on the use of evidence
in decisions:
Except as statutes otherwise provide, the proponent of a
rule or order shall have the burden of proof.  Any evi-
dence, oral or documentary, may be received, but every
agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclu-
sion of immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence and
no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be issued
except as supported by relevant, reliable, and probative
evidence.83
Thus, Congress dealt with the evidence issue by bifurcating the evi-
dence requirement.  To accommodate the need for free admission
of information, unfettered by the restrictions of the court rules of
evidence, all evidence was admissible, limited only by restraints
against useless or redundant information.  To accommodate those
concerned that this open gate standard would allow use of dubious
evidence that otherwise would have been screened out by court
rules of evidence, the bill provided that in the end, the agency was
required to cite only reliable evidence to support its decision.  Con-
gress was trying to get to what a normal person would rely on in
responsible matters in their lives:
There are no real rules of probity and reliability even in
courts of law, but there are certain standards and princi-
ples – usually applied tacitly and resting mainly upon
common sense – which people engaged in the conduct of
responsible affairs instinctively understand and act upon.
They may vary with the circumstances and kind of case,
but they exist and must be rationally applied.  These prin-
ciples, under this subsection, are to govern in administra-
tive proceedings.84
The fact that the structure splits the standard of admissibility of
evidence from the standard necessary to support a final decision is
made plain in the Senate debate on the bill.  In the debate, the
sponsor of the bill, Senator McCarran, was asked whether the Com-
mittee intentionally chose the phrase “except as supported by rele-
83. Id.
84. Id.
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vant, reliable, and probative evidence.”85  Senator McCarran
responded by explaining the origin of the bifurcation solution on
evidence:
[R]ather than curtail the agencies, we sought an interme-
diate ground which we thought would be protective of
the rights of individuals, and at the same time would not
handicap the agencies.  So we said to the (representatives
of agencies) “You may go outside and get what would be
secondary evidence, or hearsay; you may perhaps even go
into the realm of conjecture; but when you write your de-
cision it must be based upon probative evidence and
nothing else.  If in the formation of your decision you
consider other than probative evidence, your decision will
be subject to being set aside by a court of review.”  In
other words, we did not wish to destroy the administrative
agencies or prescribe the methods under which they have
been operating. . . .  Then we laid down the rule that the
administrative agencies must not make a finding which
impinges upon an individual unless there is behind such
finding probative evidence to sustain it.  That is what we
have worked out in this bill.86
85. 92 CONG. REC. 2,157 (1946).
86. Id.  In the House debate, Congressman Walter  (chairman of the subcommit-
tee reviewing the bill) stated that the standard of evidence for decisions is different
from admissibility, making clear that the reason is the fear that agencies might use free
admissibility to render decisions on insubstantial evidence:
The requirement that agencies may act only upon relevant, probative, and
substantial evidence means that the accepted standards of proof, as distin-
guished from the mere admissibility of evidence, are to govern in adminis-
trative proceedings as they do in courts of law and equity.  The same
provision contains two other limitations – first, that the agency must ex-
amine and consider the whole of the evidence relevant to any issue and,
secondly, that it must decide in accordance with the evidence.  Under these
provisions the function of an administrative agency is clearly not to decide
arbitrarily or to act contrary to the evidence or upon surmise or suspicion
or untenable inference.  Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence – see Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.,305 U.S.
197, 230 (1938).  Under this provision agencies are not authorized to de-
cide in accordance with preconceived ideas or merely to sustain or vindi-
cate prior administrative action, but they must enter upon a bona fide
consideration of the record with a view to reaching a just decision upon the
whole of it.
92 CONG. REC., H. 5753 (May 24, 1946).
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As reported out of the House Committee on May 3, 1946, ad-
justments were made to the decisional standard in the bill to delete
the word “relevant” because it had been added to the admission
standard, and to add to the decisional standard the word “substan-
tial” and a requirement of consideration of the “whole record” to
conform to the judicial review standard.87  It was in this form that
the Administrative Procedure Act was passed without a dissenting
vote in either house.88  It was signed into law by President Truman
on June 11, 1946.89
87. The language of the bill was modified to make reference to giving considera-
tion to the “whole record” and the sanction being “supported by and in accordance
with” the requisite standard of evidence, which was now slightly changed to delete the
reference to “relevant” in the trilogy and adding a reference to “substantial:”
Except as statutes otherwise provide, the proponent of a rule or order shall
have the burden of proof.  Any oral or documentary evidence may be re-
ceived, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion
of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction
shall be imposed or rule or order be issued except upon consideration of
the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and
as supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative and substan-
tial evidence.
S. 7, 79th CONG. 2D SESS. 33 (May 3, 1946).
The House Report explains that the word “relevant” was stricken from the trilogy
of what is needed to support a decision because the provision was simultaneously
changed to require the exclusion of “irrelevant” evidence from admission. H.R. REP.
NO. 79-1980, at 53 n.16.  The reference to the “whole record” was inserted to conform
to the standard of the appeal court review elsewhere in the legislation. Id. at 53 n.17.
The word “substantial” was added to the standard of evidence for the same reasons as
the “whole record” requirement: to conform to the standard of review. Id. at 53 n.18.
88. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947),
at 6, available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/refrnc/agintro.htm.
89. Id.  The provision governing hearings and decisions now reads:
§ 556. Hearings; presiding employees; powers and duties; burden of proof;
evidence; record as basis of decision
* * *
(d) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or
order has the burden of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may be
received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion
of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction may
not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the
whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and
in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. The
agency may, to the extent consistent with the interests of justice and the
policy of the underlying statutes administered by the agency, consider a
violation of section 557(d) of this title sufficient grounds for a decision ad-
verse to a party who has knowingly committed such violation or knowingly
caused such violation to occur. A party is entitled to present his case or
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4. Judicial Review Evidence Standard
The evidentiary judicial review standard established through
pre-APA judicial decisions was whether the agency hearing decision
was supported by “substantial evidence.”90  The legislative contest
was on whether review should be tightened.  One early bill, for ex-
ample, appeared to seek to make certain, even though it may be
inferred from judicial decisions, that “probative value” was required
by providing for setting aside “findings of facts, inferences, or con-
clusions of facts unsupported, upon the whole record, by substan-
tial evidence having probative value . . . .”91
When work resumed on administrative procedure legislation
in 1944, an American Bar Association drafted bill provided for even
further restrictions.  It provided that the reviewing court shall hold
unlawful any agency action to the extent it is “unsupported by com-
petent, material, and substantial evidence, upon the whole record
as reviewed by the court . . . .”92  The term “competent” is usually
associated with admissibility of evidence in court proceedings.93
When legislation was reintroduced as S. 7 in early 1945, it also con-
defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and
to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts. In rule making or determining claims for money or
benefits or applications for initial licenses an agency may, when a party will
not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or
part of the evidence in written form.
90. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
91. S. 918, 77th Cong. § 805 (1941).  Judicial review also had always encompassed
aspects beyond evidence. E.g., Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.,
215 U.S. 452, 470 (1910) and Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Union Pac. R. Co., 222
U.S. 541, 547 (1912).  Early bills included a number of items under the scope of judicial
review. For example, bill S. 918 in the 77th Congress provided for review of questions
of:
Constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (2) the statutory au-
thority and jurisdiction of the agency: (3) the lawfulness and adequacy of
the procedure followed by the agency in the particular case; (4) findings of
facts, inference, or conclusions of facts unsupported, upon the whole re-
cord, by substantial evidence having probative value; and (5) administrative
action otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or involving abuse of discretion.
S. 918, 77th Cong. § 805 (1941).  The various elements of judicial review are now in 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2004).  This article focuses only on evidentiary review.
92. S. 2030, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. (1944).
93. E.g., BALLENTINE LAW DICTIONARY 233 (3d ed. 1969) (“Competency of evi-
dence.  The admissibility of evidence under the established rules of evidence.” (citation
omitted)).
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tained the “competent” requirement.94  Subsequently, a Committee
Print setting forth revisions after receipt of varying views deleted
the “competent” evidence requirement and changed the language
to:
“(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case sub-
ject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8.”95
The late 1945 Senate report on S. 7 stayed with the substantial evi-
dence language in the Committee Print and included a whole re-
cord requirement:
“Substantial evidence” means evidence which on the
whole record is clearly substantial, sufficient to support a
finding or conclusion under section 7(c), and material to
the issues.
* * *
The requirement of review upon “the whole record”
means that courts may not look only to the case presented
by one party, since other evidence may weaken or even
indisputably destroy that case.96
A report of the Attorney General on S. 7, which the Senate report
called a “favorable report on the bill,” was contained in an appen-
dix to the Senate Report.97  On the evidence scope the Attorney
General’s report went back to the judiciary standard, stating:
Clause (5) is intended to embody the law as declared, for
example, in Consol. Edison Co.  v. NLRB.  There the Chief
Justice said: ‘Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.98
As passed, the law provided the reviewing court:
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and
conclusions found to be . . . (5) unsupported by substan-
tial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of
sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of
94. S. 7, 79th Cong. § 10(e) (1945).
95. S. Comm. Print on § 7, 79th Cong, § 10(e) (1945).
96. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 28 (1945).
97. Id. at 37-45.
98. Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
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an agency hearing provided by statute. . . .  In making the
foregoing determinations [under each of the various pow-
ers of review] the court shall review the whole record or
such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and
due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial
error.99
The Attorney General’s Manual, published in 1947, in reference to
the evidentiary judicial review standard, returned to the judicial
precedent, stating:
It is clear that nothing in section 7(c) is intended to
change the standard or scope of judicial review; section
10(e)(5) specifically restates the “substantial evidence
rule”, as developed by the Congress and the courts, under
which the reviewing court ascertains whether the agency’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.100
Further word on the somewhat amorphous struggle of Con-
gress to heighten review and of the administration to leave the
more lenient review of Supreme Court precedent in place was spo-
ken by the Supreme Court in 1951, when the issue of the eviden-
tiary standard of review under the APA first came to it.  An opinion
written by Justice Frankfurter approached the issue of the review
standard in a way consistent with pre-APA Supreme Court prece-
dent, but acknowledging the Congressional concerns.101  The opin-
ion noted that prior to the APA, the Court had interpreted the
standard that National Labor Relations Board decisions be upheld
if “supported by evidence” to mean “substantial evidence.”102  It
noted that the Court had subsequently described substantial evi-
dence as “more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”103
The Court noted that the legislative history showed some de-
sire for closer judicial review, including consideration of the “whole
99. Pub. L. No. 79-404 § 10(e) (1946).
100. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
supra note 88, at 77.
101. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
102. Id. at 477 (citing Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937)).
103. Id. (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
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record.”104  Taking these factors into account the Court concluded
that the APA changed review standards in two ways.105  First the
adoption of the “whole record” standard meant that decisions
could not be tested only on whether some part of the record would
support the agency decisions without taking into account contradic-
tory portions of the record.106  Secondly, in a more subtle interpre-
tation, the Court noted that while the terminology of “substantial
evidence” was not changed in the statute, the mood of Congress
suggested it was meant to be taken as a somewhat broader scope of
review than previously followed by some courts.107  The Court saw
this as being a difficult to define aspect of judicial function, but one
within traditional roles.108
104. The Court stated that pre-APA formulations led in time to an interpretation
that if even an isolated portion of the record could meet this standard, the agency
action would be upheld and that this led to criticism that agencies were basing their
decisions on flimsy evidence. Id. at 477-79.  The Court noted that these criticisms led to
the early administrative procedure legislation, which was vetoed by President Roosevelt.
Id. at 479.  The opinion noted that, subsequently, the Final Report of the Attorney
General’s Committee endorsed continuing the “substantial evidence” standard of re-
view. Id. at 480.  The Court observed, however, that a minority report complained that
courts would uphold agency actions if any portion of the record could support it, even
if there was a preponderance of countervailing evidence. Id. at 481-82.  The Court
stated that the minority used, for the first time, the expression that the evidence should
be considered “on the whole record.” Id. at 481, 482 and nn. 14-15.  The Court also
observed that while the term “substantial evidence” was carried forward from current
practice, the legislative history showed considerable unhappiness over the failure of
courts to rein in agency actions which legislative reports described as based on “suspi-
cion, surmise, implications, or plainly incredible evidence.” Id. at 483-84 and notes
thereto.
105. Id. at 487-91.  The Court had before it consideration of both the APA and the
Taft-Harley Act, but found a similarity of legislative history and an “identity” between
the two on the proof needed to support a decision.
106. Id. at 487-88.  The Court stated:
Whether or not it was ever permissible for courts to determine the substan-
tiality of evidence supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the basis of
evidence which in and of itself justified it, without taking into account con-
tradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be
drawn, the new legislation definitively precludes such a theory or review
and bars its practice.
107. 340 U.S. at 489-91.
108. Id. at 490.  The Court stated:
Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdi-
cate the conventional judicial function.  Congress has imposed on them
responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds.
That responsibility is not less real because it is limited to enforcing the re-
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III. THE APPLICATION OF EVIDENCE STANDARDS
A. The Role of Constitutional Considerations
The appropriate starting point in analyzing the application of
evidence standards after the APA is the Constitution.  This may
seem a little surprising given the concentration in the legislative
history on working out a specific structure to be applied.  However,
there are sound reasons for first considering constitutional issues.
Because the whole purpose of more relaxed evidence standards in
administrative proceedings is to allow in pretty much all relevant
evidence, a point will be reached, particularly with attenuated
forms of hearsay, that will test the minimums required by due pro-
cess under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.109  This con-
trasts with court rules of evidence, which generally exclude hearsay
or allow exceptions that meet constitutional requirements.  Consti-
tutional standards are also relevant because, as discussed below,
they involve a balancing of considerations in determining the ex-
tent of the use of evidence in administrative proceedings.  Promi-
nent in the balancing process are factors such as reliability and
probativeness, which also constitute evidence standards under the
statutory scheme.
1. Richardson v. Perales
The leading case on evidence in administrative proceedings is
Richardson v. Perales.110  It is most often cited for the holding that
not only is hearsay admissible in administrative proceedings, but it
can form a valid basis for a decision by itself.111  Less observed is the
quirement that evidence appear substantial when viewed, on the record as a
whole, by courts invested with the authority and enjoying the prestige of the
Courts of Appeals.
109. See Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Rosendo-
Ramirez v. INS, 32 F.3d 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1994); Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d
814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2003);
Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1996); Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053,
1056 (5th Cir. 1990)). The Court’s opinion stated: “[A]dministrative agencies are not
bound by the hearsay rule or any other of the conventional rules of evidence, but only
by the looser standard of due process of law.”
110. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
111. See, e.g., Echostar Communications Corp. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 749, 753 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
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fact that the Court’s decision was based on constitutional
requirements.
In Perales, a claimant for Social Security disability benefits went
through a series of examinations by physicians during treatment
and the claims process.112  He claimed disability because of back
problems, but the physicians, other than his own physician, found
no serious disability, and some reported apparent faking by the ap-
plicant.113  At the Social Security Administration hearing, held after
agency denials of disability benefits, the claimant appeared with his
own treating physician and both testified in support of a finding of
disability.  His lawyer objected to the admission of the written re-
ports of several of the physicians that had seen him as part of his
treatment or for evaluation for benefits.114  The lawyer objected on
several grounds, including hearsay and absence of an opportunity
for cross-examination.115  The Social Security Act and regulations
provided that a claimant could request the issuance of subpoenas,
but the claimant here had not made a request for subpoenas for
the testimony of the physicians who provided the written reports.116
The objections were overruled and the physician reports and
records were received.117 The hearing examiner also called another
physician as an independent medical adviser.  He provided testi-
mony and an opinion based on his review of the medical evidence.
The claimant objected to this testimony and cross-examined this ex-
pert.118  Based on all the evidence, including the physician reports
and the testimony of the independent medical advisor, the hearing
examiner found that the claimant had not met his burden of proof
and was not entitled to disability benefits.119
The claimant appealed to the district court.120  The district
court held that the evidence on which the decision was based was
hearsay and declined to accept the physician opinions in the writ-
112. Perales, 402 U.S. at 390-95.
113. Id. at 392-95.
114. Id. at 395.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 397.
117. Id.
118. Perales, 402 U.S. at 396.
119. Id. at 396-97.
120. Id. at 397-98.  At that time, appeals were initially made to District Courts.  Now,
appeals are made only to Circuit Courts of Appeals.
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ten reports as substantial evidence without cross-examination.121  It
remanded the case for a new hearing.122  The Court of Appeals
held that hearsay was admissible under the Social Security Act and
that the written physician reports specifically were admissible.123  It
also held that because the claimant did not seek subpoenas, he was
not in a position to complain of lack of confrontation or cross-ex-
amination.124  Nevertheless, the court found that the reports and
the testimony of the adviser did not constitute sufficient evidence
when it was objected to and was contradicted by the only live fact
witnesses.125
The Supreme Court noted that the Social Security Act pro-
vides: “Evidence may be received at any hearing before the Secre-
tary even though inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to
court procedure.”126  From this and the overall indications of infor-
mality for procedure, the Court concluded that the proceedings
generally are to be conducted more informally than formally and
that “strict rules of evidence, applicable in the courtroom, are not
to operate at social security hearings so as to bar the admission of
evidence otherwise pertinent.”127  The Court stated that the APA is
consistent with the Social Security Act, and indeed is derived from
it, and that “[h]earsay, under either Act, is thus admissible up to
the point of relevancy.”128
In considering the appeal, the Court used the “substantial evi-
dence” standard for review set forth in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB,129 that held that such evidence is “more than a mere scin-
tilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”130  The Court in Per-
ales concluded that a written report by a qualified physician who has
examined a claimant may be received as evidence and despite its
hearsay character, the absence of cross-examination, and the pres-
121. Id. at 397-98.
122. Id. at 398.
123. Id.
124. Perales 402 U.S. at 398.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 400 (quoting § 205(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)).
127. Id. at 400.
128. Id. at 400-01.
129. 305 U.S. 197.
130. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 229).
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ence of opposing live medical testimony, can constitute substantial
evidence when the claimant did not seek subpoena power with re-
spect to the physicians who created the reports.131  A necessary part
of this conclusion is a holding that at least in some circumstances
not only is hearsay admissible, but hearsay alone can be sufficient to
constitute substantial evidence.132
Most important for determining the actual standard to be ap-
plied to evidence, however, is the analysis by which the Court got to
its conclusion.  The Court had to address the claimant’s assertion
that the use of the hearsay reports without cross-examination vio-
lated constitutional rights to due process.133  The fundamental is-
sue of due process has recurring importance to all hearsay evidence
because hearsay inherently involves lack of cross-examination.
The Court noted at the outset that it accepted that due process
rights apply to administrative proceedings, but that the require-
ments of due process vary.134  The Court quoted Hannah v.
Larche :135 “[P]rocedural due process is applicable to the adjudica-
tive administrative proceeding involving ‘the differing rules of fair
play, which through the years, have become associated with differ-
ing types of proceedings. . . .’”136
The Court also quoted Goldberg v. Kelly on the variation in the
requirements of due process:137
[The] extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to
which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss’. . . .
Accordingly . . . consideration of what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of
the government function involved as well as of the private
131. Id. at 402.
132. This removes from federal administrative proceedings application of the “re-
siduum rule” for administrative proceedings, which holds that even if evidence that
would be excluded in a court proceeding is admitted in an administrative proceedings,
it can never itself constitute sufficient evidence to support a decision in the absence of
sufficient court admissible evidence that would.
133. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401-02, 406-07.
134. Id. 401-02.
135. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
136. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Hannah, 363 U.S. at 442).
137. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
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interest that has been affected by governmental
action.”138
The Court stated the constitutional issue as: “The question, then, is
as to what procedural due process requires with respect to examin-
ing physicians’ reports in a social security disability claim hear-
ing.”139  This was the context when the Court went on to state that
the written reports could be used to support the decision.  The
Court was prompted to this conclusion by a “number of factors”
that “assure underlying reliability and probative value.”140
The Court in Perales did not elaborate on how these factors
satisfy due process, but the reference to the varying requirements of
due process in Hannah and Goldberg shows, as discussed more fully
below, that the test is whether further procedures are reasonably
needed to test the truthfulness of the evidence.141  The Court essen-
tially held that the use of hearsay, even hearsay alone, as the basis of
a decision meets due process requirements if the hearsay has attrib-
138. Perales, 402 U.S. 401-02 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63).
139. Id. at 402.
140. Id.  The Court cited a number of factors that supported its conclusion in this
particular case of the reliability and probative value of the evidence and, by implication,
the lack of need for further testing to produce a fair result:
- There was no apparent bias by those creating the hearsay since they were
disinterested professional physicians. Id. at 402-03.
- The hearsay was created by a system, the social security system, that is
directed toward reliability and impartiality. Id. at 403.
- The hearsay is from a process, producing medical reports, based on detail
and routine practice. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402.
- The hearsay represents a range of examinations by different types of spe-
cialists. Id. at 404.
- The hearsay was consistent among the reports. Id. at 404.
- The claimant did not take advantage of an opportunity to request subpoe-
nas for the physicians. Id. at 404-05.
- Under court rules of evidence written medical reports have been received
as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. at 405-06.
Based on these factors, the Court concluded that despite the due process objections,
the hearsay was not only admissible, but it properly provided the basis for the decision.
Id. at 402.
141. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402.  The Court’s reference to a test of “reliability and pro-
bative value” was not addressed to the requirement in the APA that an agency’s decision
must be based “on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a
party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 556(d).  The reference comes in the context of the analysis of con-
stitutional requirements, and there are no accompanying statutory or regulatory cites to
the reference.
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utes of reliability and probative value such that little would be ad-
ded by further testing.  This is consistent with the Court’s reference
that the Social Security Act and the APA both permit hearsay and
that “[t]he matter comes down to the question of the procedure’s
integrity and fundamental fairness.”142  This has importance in es-
tablishing a minimum standard for the use of hearsay evidence in
administrative proceedings.
2. Factors in Varying Due Process Requirements
Generally
As reflected in the references to Hannah and Goldberg in Perales,
the process that is due under the Constitution is dependant on the
circumstances.  This involves a balancing of factors.  One of the fac-
tors used, even though not explicitly articulated in Perales, is the
extent of the need for testing evidence.  For example, in Gilbert v.
Homar,143 where the Court was determining whether a campus po-
liceman at a state university was entitled to a pre-suspension admin-
istrative hearing, the court recited the standard for balancing
factors in determining the constitutional process that is due, based
on the circumstances:
To determine what process is constitutionally due, we
have generally balanced three distinct factors: “First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government’s interest.”144
Although Homar dealt with whether a party is entitled to a
hearing, a fundamental issue that encompasses evidence is what the
value of additional procedural safeguards would be.145  As discussed
below, in the evidence context that translates into what would be
142. Perales, 402 U.S. at 410.
143. 520 U.S. 924 (1997).
144. Id. at 931-32 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)) (emphasis
added).
145. The Court was determining whether a campus policeman at a state university
who was put on unpaid leave after a drug felony arrest was entitled to a pre-suspension
hearing.  The Court held that no hearing was required under the due process standard
because little in the way of due process could be added by a hearing.  The Court had
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the value to truth-determining in requiring live testimony instead of
hearsay, or, on the other end of the question, is the hearsay suffi-
ciently reliable such that live testimony is not needed.146  The inter-
ests of respondents and costs to the government are the other two
issues that must be placed in the balance.
The concept that due process is not a set standard has a long
history, and the extension of due process rights in administrative
proceedings may be said to have reached a high point in Goldberg v.
Kelley,147 cited in Perales.  Although Goldberg dealt with whether
there was a right to a hearing, it contained a reference to a right to
cross-examination that is often cited by opponents of the use of
hearsay evidence in particular cases, as in Perales.148  Because this is
an oft-cited case that can be misunderstood in the context of the
use of hearsay and cross-examination, it is appropriate to examine
it closely.
noted that due process is a flexible concept that is dependent on circumstances.  The
Court stated:
It is by now well established that “‘due process,’ unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances.” Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972).
Id. at 930.  The Court found, as the most important determinant, that little would be
served by the procedure of a hearing because dismissal under the regulations was based
on the arrest and there was no dispute about the arrest.  In other words, there must be a
material fact in dispute that the proposed due process procedure would affect in order
for the denial of the procedure to be a violation of due process rights. For discussion on
the hearing elements required by due process generally in administrative proceedings,
see, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,
§§ 9.1–9.12, at 1-116 (3d ed., 1994); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1267, 1282-87 (1975).
146. See infra notes 200-210 and accompanying text. R
147. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
148. The Court in Perales separately addressed the claimant’s reliance on holdings
and statements in Goldberg “that due process requires notice ‘and an effective opportu-
nity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses . . . .’” Perales, 402 U.S. at 406-07
(quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68). Perales distinguished Goldberg on the differing
circumstances, all of which have relevance to due process requirements, as shown in the
discussion below. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 406.  The Court noted that in the case before it,
it was not dealing with termination of disability benefits once granted; nor was there a
change in status without notice; the physician reports were available for inspection; the
authors were known and subject to subpoenaing; and, significantly, credibility and ve-
racity was not at issue. Id. at 407.
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Goldberg involved the termination of benefits to a recipient of
public welfare.  The applicable regulations provided for a post-ter-
mination hearing at which the recipient could appear personally,
offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, and have a record made of the hearing.149  Prior to
termination, however, the regulations provided only for notifica-
tion to the subject of the intended termination, a right to request
within seven days that a higher official review the record, and a
right to submit a written statement in support of the request for
review.150  If the review was unfavorable to the recipient, aid was
stopped immediately and the recipient was notified by letter of the
reasons.151  The Court found these procedures inadequate under
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution because rights to a hear-
ing should have been accorded before the termination.152  The
Court recognized that the particular due process hearing rights
that must be provided vary depending upon the circumstances.153
The Court held that the exigencies in this situation, where an
eligible welfare recipient might be deprived of the very means to
live, outweigh the benefits of summary adjudication, and thus hear-
ing rights must be provided before termination.154  The Court held
149. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 259-60.
150. Id. at 258-59.
151. Id. at 259.
152. Id. at 264.
153. The Court stated:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be “condemned to suffer griev-
ous loss,” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and depends upon whether the recipi-
ent’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in
summary adjudication. Accordingly, as we said in Cafeteria & Rest. Workers
Union, etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), “consideration of what proce-
dures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with
a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved
as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action.” See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442 (1960).
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 264-66.  The factual situation was seen by the Court as extreme, and the
opinion has generally been distinguished on that ground. See, e.g., Crook v. Baker, 813
F.2d 88, 98-99 (6th Cir. 1987):
The district court was aware of and discussed the opinion of this court in
Frumkin v. Bd. of Trustees, 626 F.2d 19 (6th Cir., 1980), which held that a
tenured college professor, who was discharged for stated reasons that ad-
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that although a full evidentiary hearing is not required before ter-
mination, basic procedures must be employed.155  The Court noted
that the fundamental requisite of due process is “an opportunity to
be heard,” and the hearing must be “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”156  It held that in this context, that means
timely notice of the reasons for the proposed termination and “an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse wit-
nesses and by presenting his own argument and evidence orally.”157
With respect to confrontation of witnesses, in the statement that is
often cited by opponents of hearsay in administrative hearings, the
court stated: “In almost every setting where important decisions
turn on question of fact, due process requires an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”158  The Court also
cited Greene v. McElroy,159 for the proposition that cross-examination
is an important protection “where evidence consists of the testi-
mony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact,
might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.”160  The Court concluded that
welfare recipients must be “given an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the department.”161
There are several factors to be considered in the use of the
“confront and cross-examine” statement in Goldberg that illuminate
its use, or limitations in its use, on evidence matters such as hearsay.
versely reflected upon him, was not entitled to have his counsel examine
and cross- examine witnesses at the hearing that resulted in such findings.
In reaching this result, this court discussed Goldberg v. Kelly, (see supra note
138) and stated:
We cannot, however, accept appellant’s contention that we should
rule in his favor on the basis of an analogy between the problems
which beset an unrepresented welfare recipient confronted with an
administrative court and the position of a professional academic
who, under the direction of his attorney, presents his case to a panel
of fellow faculty members.
Crook, 813 F.2d at 98-99 (citation omitted).
155. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-67.
156. Id. at 267 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) and Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), respectively.)
157. Id. at 267-68.
158. Id. at 269.
159. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
160. Goldberg, 397 U. S. at 270 (quoting Greene, 360 U.S. at 496-97).
161. Id. at 270.
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First, Goldberg was dealing in the abstract.  That is, there was no spe-
cific evidence, or even witness, before it.  Since there had been no
hearing, the Court was speaking conceptually of what it thought
should be required generally in a hearing to be held.162  Further,
the Court apparently believed that there were factual disputes and
issues of credibility and veracity that needed to be brought out in
the open so that the facts could be tested.163  This is relevant be-
cause this involves a confrontation/know-one’s-accusers right, not
applicable to hearsay in the traditional form where the declarant is
known and where the evidence may be of routine nature and even
allowed under the FRE.  The Court’s assertion in Goldberg of the
need to confront witnesses is seen in the cases cited by the Court.
The principal case cited is Greene v. McElroy.164
In Greene, during the cold war communist scare period an exec-
utive in a company supplying the military had his security clearance
revoked on the grounds of association with communists.  In the
hearing before a board he was given a chance to provide evidence,
which he did by his own testimony and that of co-workers and
others, but the board stated that the transcript of the hearing would
not disclose all the material in the file of the case, specifically ex-
cluding from disclosure the FBI report of investigation and the
identity of confidential informants.165  The Court ultimately side-
stepped the issue of whether this process violated the Constitution,
ruling instead that the process used did not have necessary Con-
gressional or Presidential authorization.166  Before doing so, how-
ever, it made statements on constitutional due process principles,
later cited and quoted in Goldberg and in many other opinions on
administrative proceedings, including:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmen-
tal action seriously injures an individual, and the reasona-
bleness of the action depends on fact findings, the
evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be
162. Id. at 267-72 (enumerating the several elements of a hearing).
163. Id. at 268-69 (noting that challenges on incorrect factual bases and credibility
and veracity were at issue).
164. Greene, 360 U.S. 474 (cited in Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270).
165. Id. at 485-89.
166. Id. at 499-508.
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disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity
to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the
case of documentary evidence, it is even more important
where the evidence consists of the testimony of individu-
als whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjur-
ers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance,
prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections
in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion. They have ancient roots.  They find expression in
the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal
cases the accused shall enjoy the right “to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” This Court has been zeal-
ous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out
not only in criminal cases, e.g., but also in all types of
cases where administrative and regulatory actions were
under scrutiny.167
167. Id. at 496-97 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
One of the other two cases cited by Goldberg similarly involved unidentified accus-
ers.  In Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963) the peti-
tioner had been denied bar admission by a review committee without identification of
negative sources or opportunity to confront those sources.  The other case, Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913) involved
an attempt by the ICC to avoid any hearing rights, with the Court stating:
The government further insists that the commerce act (26 Stat. at L. 743,
chap. 128, U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3163) requires the Commission to ob-
tain information necessary to enable it to perform the duties and carry out
the objects for which it was created; and having been given legislative power
to make rates it can act, as could Congress, on such information, and there-
fore its findings must be presumed to have been supported by such infor-
mation, even though not formally proved at the hearing. But such a
construction would nullify the right to a hearing,—for manifestly there is no
hearing when the party does not know what evidence is offered or considered, and is
not given an opportunity to test, explain, or refute. . . . The Commission is an
administrative body and, even where it acts in a quasi judicial capacity, is not
limited by the strict rules, as to the admissibility of evidence, which prevail in suits
between private parties. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25.
But the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more impera-
tive the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which
rights are asserted or defended. In such cases the Commissioners cannot act
upon their own information, as could jurors in primitive days. All parties must be
fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given oppor-
tunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in ex-
planation or rebuttal. In no other way can a party maintain its rights or make
its defense. In no other way can it test the sufficiency of the facts to support
the finding; for otherwise, even though it appeared that the order was with-
out evidence, the manifest deficiency could always be explained on the the-
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These statements in Greene are criticizing the use in a politically in-
flamed situation of unidentified sources that are being relied on
effectively as witnesses at trial, with the defendant being kept blind
and helpless.  This is far from normal hearsay, such as used in Per-
ales where identified, unbiased doctors rendered reports on medi-
cal conditions.168
Mathews v. Eldridge,169 subsequent to the Greene, Goldberg and
Perales decisions, marked a turning point.  The Court revisited the
due process requirements in a way that narrowed Goldberg and put
the cross-examination/hearsay issue more in the Perales mode, al-
though the issue in the case was, again, the right to a hearing.  In
Mathews, a person receiving social security disability payments re-
ceived a questionnaire from the state agency monitoring his medi-
cal condition.170  The recipient completed the questionnaire saying
that his condition had not improved and identifying physicians
from whom he was receiving treatment.171  The agency obtained
reports from his physicians and a psychiatric consultant.172  After
considering these reports and other information in the recipient’s
file the agency informed him that it had made a tentative determi-
nation that his disability had ended, stated the reasons for the pro-
posed termination, and advised him that he could request more
time to submit additional information.173  In a written response, the
recipient disputed only the characterization of his condition.174
The agency then made a determination that he had ceased to be
ory that the Commission had before it extraneous, unknown, but
presumptively sufficient information to support the finding.
Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
168. In a law review article, Judge Henry J. Friendly, of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, noted that while the reference in Greene to the need for cross-examination was
“wholly appropriate to the witch hunts of the McCarthy era,” he questioned its sweeping
application to the masses of administrative proceedings where such broad use is not
needed, is impractical, and can even be counterproductive to truth-testing.  Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1282-87 (1975).  Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), discussed next and adopting the Friendly approach, was
decided by the Supreme Court a year after the Friendly article.
169. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
170. Id. at 323.
171. Id. at 323-24.
172. Id. at 324.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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disabled, and the Social Security Administration cut off his bene-
fits.175  The recipient had a right to seek reconsideration, and if the
reconsideration was denied, he had a right to an evidentiary hear-
ing before a Social Security Administration ALJ.176
Instead of seeking reconsideration, the plaintiff in Mathews
brought an action in Federal district court challenging the constitu-
tionality of the procedures used to terminate his benefits.177  He
claimed that he was entitled to a pre-termination evidentiary hear-
ing consistent with the Court’s ruling in Goldberg.  The District
Court agreed that the termination of disability rights was like the
termination of welfare payments in Goldberg and that a similar evi-
dentiary hearing with similar procedural rights was required.178
The court of appeals affirmed the district court.179  When Matthews
reached the Supreme Court, the Court recognized that Fifth
Amendment due process rights apply to termination of Social Se-
curity benefits.180  The issue was what “process is due” prior to ini-
tial termination of benefits, pending review.181  The Court noted
that of the increasing number of cases coming before the Court on
the issue of the extent that due process requires an evidentiary
hearing prior to the termination of property interests, only in
Goldberg182 did the Court hold that a hearing approximating a judi-
cial trial was necessary.183  After making reference to opinions hold-
ing that only rudimentary procedures were required, the Court
pointed out that this reflects the fact that due process is flexible and
depends on consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the offi-
cial action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
175. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324.
176. Id. at 319.
177. Id. at 324-25.
178. Id. at 326.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 332.
181. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
182. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-71.
183. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
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the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.184
In weighing the balance of factors, the Court stated that in
Goldberg the Court had emphasized that the recipient was living on
the “very margin of existence,” which not need be the case for disa-
bility benefits, which are not based on financial need.185  On the
portion of the balancing test relevant to the evidence issues here,
the Court looked to what benefits additional hearing rights would
bring in these circumstances:
In order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled
worker must demonstrate by means of “medically accept-
able clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(3), that he is unable “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically de-
terminable physical or mental impairment . . . .” In short,
a medical assessment of the worker’s physical or mental
condition is required. This is a more sharply focused and
easily documented decision than the typical determina-
tion of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, a wide vari-
ety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of
witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the
decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted that in such cir-
cumstances “written submissions are a wholly unsatisfac-
tory basis for decision.”186
The Court contrasted the Goldberg situation with the Perales situation
where the factual issues can reasonably be resolved by hearsay evi-
dence that have indicia of reliability and probative value:
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability
benefits will turn, in most cases, upon “routine, standard,
and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists,”
Richardson v. Perales, concerning a subject whom they have
personally examined. In Richardson the Court recognized
the “reliability and probative worth of written medical re-
ports,” emphasizing that while there may be “professional
disagreement with the medical conclusions” the “specter
184. Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 340-41.
186. Id. at 343 (citations omitted).
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of questionable credibility and veracity is not present.” To
be sure, credibility and veracity may be a factor in the ulti-
mate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural
due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent
in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of
cases, not the rare exceptions. The potential value of an
evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the deci-
sionmaker, is substantially less in this context than in
Goldberg.187
Thus, balancing is required to determine what due process is
to be afforded, and one of the considerations is what level of proce-
dural testing of truth is needed to arrive at a correct outcome.  This
is the “question of the procedure’s integrity and fundamental fair-
ness” referred to in Perales.188  It takes into account circumstances
ranging from Greene and Goldberg with faceless, secret, probably bi-
ased witnesses providing the evidence supporting the decision with-
out any challenge, to Perales where the witnesses are known, the
bases of their information are disclosed and largely objective, and
there may even be a potential for challenging by subpoenas if the
opposing party can show a need for a subpoena.  Thus, the Court’s
evaluation of the “reliability and probativeness” of the evidence in
Perales goes, constitutionally in terms of due process, to whether
there is a need in terms of truth testing to have the evidence tested
by a requirement that the evidence can only come in through live
testimony.  The interplay of these considerations is explored fur-
ther below as to the constitutional considerations and their relation
to evidence, particularly hearsay.
3. Varying Due Process Requirements, Cross-
Examination, and Hearsay
The constitutional requirements discussed above apply to
cross-examination, both on witnesses at a hearing and as it may be
necessary to test hearsay.  Since both cross-examination of witnesses
and hearsay are central evidence vehicles, the impact of the consti-
tutional considerations are discussed here.
187. Id. at 344 (citations omitted).
188. Perales, 402 U.S. at 410.
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a. Cross-examination requirements generally
There are three principal circumstances with respect to wit-
nesses where a due process right to cross-examination could come
up.  First, there is the circumstance of witnesses who appear and
testify.  There are limits to the extent of constitutional cross-exami-
nation even in the circumstance of a witness testifying.  The fact
that cross-examination is not required under the Constitution in all
situations in administrative proceedings is illustrated in Central
Freight Lines v. United States.189  In Central Freight Lines, in an adminis-
trative hearing proceeding on applications of interstate motor carri-
ers to operate in a new market, the ALJ established a procedure to
hear a certain percentage of witnesses live and to receive verified
written statements from the rest.  Live testimony subject to cross-
examination was taken from 127 witnesses, and written statements
from approximately 1,600 witnesses were received.  Those opposing
the applications claimed that their due process rights were violated
by the limitation on cross-examination of the 1,600 witnesses.  The
court rejected the argument.  It noted that the APA “mandates only
‘such cross-examination as may be needed for a full and true disclo-
sure of the facts.’”190  Further, as to due process, the court noted
that the procedural requirement of due process depends on the
circumstances, and that here the protection afforded by the cross-
examination of a large number of witnesses versus the burden of
taking live testimony from a huge additional number of witnesses
provided adequate due process.191  The court stated:
The cross-examination allowed here was sufficient. Under
Mathews v. Eldridge, the process that is due depends on
three factors: first, the private interest affected by the offi-
cial action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value of additional procedures; and third, the gov-
ernment’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burden that the additional
procedures would entail. In this case, the private interest
lies in the appellants’ economic stake in business that may
189. 669 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1982).
190. Id. at 1068 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2004)).
191. Id.
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possibly be lost to competition from the applicants’ pro-
posed services. While this threatened loss is undoubtedly
important to appellants, the hardship does not compare
with the personal economic losses imposed without a full
evidentiary hearing in other cases. Further, the proce-
dures employed here adequately protected the appel-
lants’ interests. The cross-examination of 127 public
witnesses rendered minimal the risk of erroneously de-
priving the appellants’ interests. Additional cross-exami-
nation would have made little difference. And the burden
of cross-examining the remaining 1,600 witnesses would
have been tremendous; in fact, it would have multiplied
manifold a hearing that was already one of the longest
service extension cases on record. Likewise, the adminis-
trative and fiscal cost of cross-examining 1,600 witnesses
would have been great. Full cross-examination, in other
words, would have imposed a burden not justified by any
significant improvements in the protection of appellants’
interests or in the accuracy of the hearing procedure.192
This limitation on cross-examination is consistent with the stat-
utory limitations in the APA on cross-examination. The APA grants
a right “to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a
full and true disclosure of the facts.”193  This provision does not grant
an absolute right to cross-examination, but only as needed to de-
velop the truth.194  The burden for establishing the need for cross-
192. Id. (citation omitted). See also Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Ed., 492 F.2d 697,
701-02 (5th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975):
They contend, however, that we should read the Supreme Court’s Goldberg
[Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)] and Morrissey [Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972)] decisions as expanding the requirements of Dixon
[Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961)] to
add to them universal confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses,
especially where severe punishments are meted out on disputed facts. We
decline to do so. . . . The requirements of due process are sufficiently flexi-
ble to accommodate themselves to various persons, interests and tribunals
without reduction to a stereotype and hence to absurdity.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
194. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 859 F.2d
156, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cent. Freight Lines v. United States, 669 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th
Cir. 1982) (APA “mandates only such cross-examination as may be required for full and
true disclosure of the facts.”); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872,
880 (1st Cir. 1978). See American Public Gas Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 498 F.2d
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examination is on the proponent of cross-examination.195  A com-
plaint of a lack of cross-examination is not sufficient unless the
party complaining has exhausted alternatives.196  To establish a due
process right to cross-examination, there must be disputed facts
and the cross must go to the veracity of the witness, not just the
weight to be accorded to the evidence.197  All these elements are
718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“even in formal adjudicatory hearing under the APA, cross-
examination is not always a right”).
Taking testimony by telephone also does not violate due process.  Gibbs v. SEC, 25
F.3d 1056 (10th Cir. 1994).
195. Cellular Mobile Systems of Pa., Inc. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 182, 198 (D.C. Cir.  1985)
(“Cross-examination is therefore not an automatic right conferred by the APA; instead,
its necessity must be established under specific circumstances by the party seeking it.”);
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 880 (1st Cir. 1978):
The APA commits the decision whether to allow cross-examination to the
discretion of the person presiding at the hearing. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(5),
(c)(7), and (d). The party seeking to cross-examine bears the burden of
showing that cross-examination is in fact necessary. See American Public Gas
Ass’n v. FPC, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 176, 498 F.2d 718, 723 (1974).  Petitioners
would place the burden of establishing the need for cross-examination on
the same party bearing the burden of proof as to the substantive standards
set by § 316 of the FWPCA.  There is no merit in that argument, however.
In this instance petitioners are the proponent of a procedural order and
will properly bear the burden. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
Id. at 880 n.16.
196. Ashworth Transfer, Inc. v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 199, 202-03 (D. Utah
1970).  In Ashworth, the ICC applied a procedure in a proceeding for a grant of author-
ity for truck service in which evidence would be received by verified statements and an
oral hearing would be denied unless there is a showing by controverting affidavit that
material facts are in dispute.  The losing parties opposing the authority challenged the
order granting the authority because of the denial of a request for oral hearing and
cross-examination.  The court rejected the challenge because the challenging parties
did not controvert the basic facts and had not availed themselves of discovery opportu-
nities to challenge the facts.  The court held that “a party cannot simply fail to contro-
vert the veracity of sworn statements and then succeed in a demand for a right of cross-
examination.” Id. at 203.  This would appear to go to 1) the discretion of the agency; 2)
who has the burden of showing a need for cross-examination; and 3) the fact that due
process requires cross-examination only where it would have a function of affecting the
facts, that is, unless material facts are in dispute.
See also Williams v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573, 1578 n.9 (11th
Cir. 1986) (no due process denial where respondent did not request hearing officer’s
assistance in obtaining presence of any person and declined a continuance that would
allow him to contact witnesses).
197. Nat’l Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 634, 636 (N.D. OK.
1968).  In Nat’l Trailer, the ICC employed a procedure of accepting only written evi-
dence in a proceeding about an application for a common carrier certificate.  Parties
opposing the application requested a hearing at which they could cross-examine.  The
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consistent with the due process standards, discussed above, under
which the test is whether there are risks of having no cross-examina-
tion and to what extent cross-examination improve truth-finding.
Moreover, the restriction in the statute does not violate the Sixth
Amendment right to confront a witness against the defendant,
since that provision expressly applies only to criminal
proceedings.198
A second circumstance with respect to a due process right to
cross-examine witnesses is where available witnesses are not called
to testify by the party bringing the action.  Where there is no hear-
say issue, i.e., there is no attempt to get evidence in from the un-
called witness, there is no right to demand that the plaintiff party
call all witnesses who may have information, at least as long as the
party making the demand has subpoena power.199
request was denied and the ICC granted a common carrier certificate to the applicant.
The court held that the fundamental right to a hearing encompasses an opportunity to
challenge the claims of the opposing party and that confrontation and cross-examina-
tion are implicit in this right.  The court held that “[i]n all adjudicative proceedings
cross-examination and confrontation are the handmaidens of trustworthiness in the
fact of factual dispute.” Id. at 636.  The court stated, however, that “unless material facts
are in dispute there is no right to cross-examination and confrontation.” Id. (citations
omitted).  The court reviewed the asserted areas of dispute and found that there was no
material dispute; that the issue did not turn on the veracity of the affiants, but, instead
the claim of need for cross-examination went only to the weight of the evidence and
this was not enough to establish a due process right of confrontation and cross-
examination.
198. The Sixth Amendment applies only in criminal cases. See U.S. CONST. Amend.
VI; Bennett v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 66 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 1995):  Of course, “Ben-
nett’s invocation of the Sixth Amendment is misplaced, for the Confrontation Clause
speaks only of ‘all criminal prosecutions.’ That constitutional right does not apply to
civil administrative matters generally (Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n. 16
(1960)). . . .”
199. In Pavlik v. United States, 951 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1991), fishermen were charged
administratively for having illegal possession of a certain type of fish.  The evidence
consisted of the eyewitness testimony of two crewmembers on a fishing boat that acci-
dentally caught the fish in its nets and gave the fish to the respondents.  After the ALJ
found against the respondents, they appealed on the grounds that the agency’s (Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) failure to put its investigating agent
on the stand violated their due process rights because they could not effectively con-
front their accuser. Id. at 224.  They posited that they could have cross-examined the
agent to reveal that the crewman allegedly selected by the agent were not credible. Id.
The court held that even under an assumption that due process requires respondents
to be able confront witnesses against them in the proceedings (citing Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254 (1970)), the respondents exercised that right here in cross-examining the
witnesses at trial against them, the two crewmen. Id.  The court noted that even in
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The third circumstance is the right to cross-examine the maker
of a hearsay statement that is offered as evidence.  The issues in this
circumstance are very broad.  It is therefore discussed separately
next.
b. Issue of whether there is a constitutional need
for cross-examination where evidence
comes in through hearsay: reliability
and probativeness
As to the situation where the missing witness is the provider of
hearsay that is admitted, a due process standard generally applies.
As discussed above, a key question in this analysis is: what is the
need for cross-examination?  If the reliability of the hearsay would
likely be undermined by cross-examination, due process rights
would likely be violated if the hearsay is admitted and used.  If the
reliability of the hearsay is not likely to be substantially undercut by
cross-examination, however, it may be received and used without
cross-examination of the maker of the statement.
The role of reliability as it relates to due process rights to con-
front or cross-examine is illustrated in Felzcerek v. Immigration & Nat-
uralization Service,200 where an alien was admitted to the United
States as a nonimmigration visitor for a limited period.  The alien
overstayed the period and applied for a driver’s license using a
forged INS letter that purported to allow him to stay in the United
States for a longer period.  He was arrested at the Department of
Motor Vehicles.  In a subsequent deportation hearing the immigra-
tion judge allowed into the record, over the objection of the alien,
1) the forged INS letter, 2) the alien’s Department of Motor Vehi-
cle (“DMV”) application containing a DMV official’s handwritten
notation that the alien had submitted an “Immigration and Natu-
criminal trials, there is no right to confront a “witness” who does not testify at trial, and
that the government is not required to call all of the witnesses to a crime. Id.  Finally,
even if the right of confrontation applied, and even if it could be said to apply to wit-
nesses not called by the agency, here the respondents had subpoena power to call the
agent and even under criminal law this satisfies the confrontation right. Id. See also
Nat’l Ass’n of Psychiatric Treatment Ctrs. For Children v. Mendez, 857 F. Supp. 85, 94-
95 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that agency does not have to produce witnesses for the
purpose of allowing defendant to cross-examine); Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. United
States Envtl. Protec. Agency, 848 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
200. 75 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1996).
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ralization Letter” as proof of identification, and 3) a standard INS
form filled out by the arresting INS agent describing the circum-
stances of the arrest.  The form contained the INS agent’s state-
ment that the alien had presented the INS letter to the DMV and
that the alien claimed that he received the letter in the mail but
would not provide any further information about it.  After the alien
was ordered deported, he appealed on the basis that it was a denial
of due process for the immigration judge to admit the INS letter,
DMV application, and the INS form without giving him an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the authors of the relevant statements.  The
court noted that while due process applies in deportation hearings,
they are civil and the heightened Sixth Amendment confrontation
protections of a criminal trial are not constitutionally required.201
The court stated that the due process test for admissibility of evi-
dence in a deportation hearing is whether the evidence is probative
and whether its use is fundamentally fair.202  The court stated that
“[I]n the evidentiary context, fairness is closely related to the relia-
bility and trustworthiness of the evidence.”203  The court held that
the INS form itself was not hearsay since it was not admitted for the
truth of its contents, and that while the DMV application and INS
form contained hearsay notations, they fell within the long-recog-
nized public records exception to hearsay exclusion under the FRE,
which carries with it strong support that the admission of evidence
under such exception complies with due process.204  The court also
noted that other courts had allowed the admissibility of the INS
forms unless the subject of the proceedings raised legitimate issues
of the reliability of the particular form.205  The court stated:
201. Id. at 115.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 115-16.
205. Felzcerek, 75 F.3d at 117.  The court stated:
Other courts have agreed that a Form I-213 is presumptively reliable and
can be admitted in deportation proceedings without giving the alien the
opportunity to cross-examine the document’s author, at least when the
alien has put forth no evidence to contradict or impeach the statements in
the report. See Espinoza, 45 F.3d at 310-11; Bustos-Torres, 898 F.2d at 1056.
See also Immigration & Naturalization Serv., v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984) (noting that officer who completes a Form I-213 “rarely must
attend the hearing”). This is not a case where the reliability of the form is
somehow undermined. See Murphy v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
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“Under these circumstances, we agree with the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits that ‘[a]liens in deportation proceedings ‘may not assert a
cross-examination right to prevent the government from establish-
ing uncontested facts.’”  The Court held that the admission of the
application and form did not deprive the aliens of due process.206
In a similar vein, in Bustos-Torres v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service,207 the immigration judge in a deportation hearing admitted
a standard form filled out by an INS officer that was based on state-
ments made to the officer by the alien, presumably at the time of
apprehension.  The alien objected to the admission of the form as
hearsay and demanded that the officer be presented for cross-ex-
amination.  The hearing was adjourned to allow the appearance of
the officer, but the officer did not appear at the continued hearing
because he was at an office in another city.  The INS produced an
affidavit from the officer attesting that he filled out the form based
on an interview with the alien.  The affidavit was received over the
alien’s objection.  No other evidence was presented and the alien
was found deportable.  After noting that the court rules of evidence
do not apply to bar evidence in administrative proceedings, but that
due process does apply, the court stated that the test for admissibil-
ity is “whether the evidence is probative and whether its use is fun-
damentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of
law.”208  The court stated that the contents of the form were essen-
54 F.3d 605, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (vacating B.I.A. determination based in
part upon inaccurate I-213 for which information was provided by biased
INS informant); Cunanan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 856 F.2d
1373, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1988) (vacating B.I.A. determination premised
upon uncorroborated affidavit of absent witness and Form I-213 reporting
substance of interview of the witness by an INS officer); see also FRE 803(8)
(public records admissible “unless the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness”).
206. Id. at 117.
207. 898 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990).
208. Id. at 1055.  The court stated:
Bustos alleges that the Form I-213 amounts to hearsay, and is not properly
admissible without the testimony of the officer who filled out the form, so
that he may be available for cross examination. First we note that the rules
of evidence applicable in the courts are not applicable in deportation pro-
ceedings.  Soto-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 726 F.2d
1070 (5th Cir. 1984). Nonetheless, due process standards of fundamental
fairness extend to the conduct of deportation proceedings.  Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). The test for admissibility of evidence in a de-
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tially a recorded recollection of a conversation with the alien and
that the alien did not contest that the form reflected the officer’s
examination and did not attempt to impeach the information in
the form.209  The court upheld the admission of the form.210  Thus
cross-examination on hearsay is not constitutionally required where
it would not likely affect the credibility of the evidence.
c. Influence of Availability or Unavailability of
Witness
The admission of hearsay evidence under constitutional re-
quirements may also be affected by whether a witness is available
and the circumstances of the non-appearance of the witness.  A first
circumstance is where the witness who created the hearsay is availa-
ble live, but simply is not called by the proponent of the hearsay.  If
the hearsay is reliable in itself, there may be no need to call the
witness, as in Felzcerek, discussed above.211  There is no due process
denial because calling the witness live would not improve the truth
testing.  FRE Rule 803 likewise provides that certain forms of hear-
say may come in even if a live witness is available.  The rule pro-
vides, however, that in some applications the hearsay exception is
not available where reliability is undercut, such as in the provision
that the exception for records of regularly conducted activity is not
available if “the source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.”212
On the other hand, if the hearsay witness is available and hav-
ing the witness live would be important for determining reliability,
the admission of hearsay of an available declarant may be im-
portation proceeding is whether the evidence is probative and whether its
use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law.
See, e.g., Calderon-Ontiveros v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 809 F.2d
1050 (5th Cir.1986); Baliza v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 709 F.2d
1231 (9th Cir.1983); Tashnizi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 585
F.2d 781 (5th Cir.1978); Trias-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 528 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1055.  Although the court speaks in terms of an admissibility test, it is significant
that the court stated the constitutional test is “whether its use is fundamentally fair .” Id.
at 1055 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 1055-56.
210. Id. at 1056.
211. See infra notes 248-254 and accompanying text.
212. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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proper.213  In Olabanji v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,214 a
Nigerian citizen married an American citizen and began the pro-
cess of getting permanent resident status under the particular pro-
cess required where marriage is critical to immigration status.  At a
meeting between the married couple with an INS agent, as part of
the process, the agent talked to the wife separately.  She told the
agent that her name had been forged onto a necessary document
and that the marriage did not meet the immigration statute re-
quirements in other ways.  The agent got an affidavit from the wife.
A handwriting expert wrote a letter stating that the signature on the
necessary document was not the wife’s.  These were offered and ad-
mitted at the hearing, and the immigrant testified to the contrary.
The immigration judge entered a deportation order.  The court of
appeals noted that the relevant statute provides that in deportation
hearings persons “shall have a reasonable opportunity . . . to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the Government” and noted that
cross-examination is also subject to a constitutional right of due
process.215  It cited a judicially established standard that affidavits
cannot be used where the INS has not established that despite the
use of reasonable efforts the presence of the witness could not be
obtained.216  The court also recognized that this does not apply
213. See, e.g., Galvin v. New York Racing Ass’n, 70 F. Supp. 2d 163, 177-80 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (finding state board admission of brief, written investigative notes when there was
a lack of effort to produce witnesses live was a violation of due process, particularly
when only short notice of hearing was given).
214. 973 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1992).
215. Id. at 1234 (citations omitted).
216. Id. at 1234-35 (citing Hernandez-Garza v. INS, 882 F.2d 945, 948 (5th Cir.
1989); Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Dallo v. INS, 765 F.2d 581,
586 (6th Cir. 1985); Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1983)).
In Bustos-Torres, 898 F.2d at 1056 n.2, the court noted that in a case where the alien
contradicted the statements in an affidavit and the government made no effort to pro-
duce the witness, another circuit found this to be a violation of the statute’s right of
cross-examination because it would leave the government’s choice about whether to
produce a witness wholly unfettered. Id. at 1056 n.2.  The court found that the form in
Bustos-Torres, however, was uncontested as to the validity of the alien’s statement in the
form, and since it was “clearly relevant and material and is not repetitious,” it was prop-
erly admitted. Id. at 1056.  The central conclusion of Bustos reflects the balancing de-
scribed above: where there is no real challenge to the reliability of the hearsay, a denial
of cross-examination is not a violation of due process since little could be accomplished
in terms of truth-finding; and on the other side, requiring live witnesses in such situa-
tions would be a unreasonable burdening of an essential government function.  But if
there are suspicious circumstances to the non-appearance of the witness when the sub-
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where the facts are not reasonably contested.217  Thus, affidavits can
be used where the deportee cannot raise a reasonable challenge to
the contents of the affidavit, but where the deportee asserts a rea-
sonable challenge, the affidavit may be excluded where the propo-
nent does not establish the reasonable efforts that had been made
to obtain the presence of the witness.  Here the witness took the
stand and testified that his wife signed the document and that the
contents of the affidavit were false, presenting a direct challenge to
the truthfulness of the hearsay evidence.  Because the INS did not
show why the handwriting expert could not be produced or what
efforts were made to try to produce the wife, the deportation order
was reversed.218  These distinctions are consistent with the due pro-
cess balancing of factors.  Given the first factor that an important
individual right is at issue, the question is what is the need for cross-
examination to test for truthfulness and what is the feasibility of the
proposed procedure in light of the needs of the operation of the
government function.
A related consideration on the availability of witnesses is
whether the party opposing the admission has subpoena power to
summon the hearsay declarant but has failed to exercise that
power.  In Perales, the fact that the claimant had not requested a
subpoena was a factor in finding that due process was not de-
nied.219  A larger issue is whether hearsay evidence, particularly in
the form of substituting a written statement of a witness in place of
live testimony, can be used if the opponent does not have subpoena
power.
Some courts have held that if no credible challenge to the reli-
ability of the hearsay is raised, there may not be a requirement that
the party opposing the use of the evidence to be able to subpoena
the declarant.  In Butera v. Apfel,220 the court held that even where
subpoena power to test hearsay was available but a request for its
use was denied, a decision could be based on the hearsay.  In practi-
ject matter of the action puts the truth to be provided by the witness in contention, a
court could conclude that due process is being denied.
217. Olabanji, 973 F.2d at 1234, n.1 (citing Bustos-Torres 898 F.2d 1053) and Calde-
ron-Ontiveros v. INS, 809 F.2d at 1053).
218. Id. at 1034-36.
219. 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
220. 173 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 1999).
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cal effect, this is Perales with the subpoena issue removed.  In Butera,
a claimant sought Social Security disability benefits.  The state
agency denied benefits because two agency physicians reviewing the
reports of three examining physicians found an ability to do work.
The claimant appealed the decision to the Department of Health
and Human Services.  At the resulting hearing, the ALJ had reports
from the three examining physicians and the two reviewing physi-
cians.  None of the physicians testified.  The ALJ denied a request
of the claimant for subpoenas for the non-examining physicians
and upheld the denial of the disability claim.  On appeal, the claim-
ant objected to the denial of the subpoenas.  The court noted that
the regulations for allowing cross-examination in social security ad-
ministrative proceedings is “[w]hen it is reasonably necessary for
the full presentation of the case,” which it found consistent with the
APA provision that entitles a party to “such cross-examination as
may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”221  The
court noted that the Court in Perales, in upholding a decision based
only on written reports, had cited the impartiality of the workings
of the social security process, the impartiality and routine nature of
medical reports, and the practical consideration of providing live
medical testimony.222  Although the Supreme Court in Perales had
referenced the fact that the claimant had not sought the issuance of
a subpoena, the court of appeals cited a case that held that the
issuance of a subpoena is not an absolute right and which assumed
if the claimant in Perales had not been able to demonstrate the need
for cross-examination, the outcome would not have been differ-
ent.223  Placing the burden on the claimant here, the court found
that the arguments advanced—“that [the physicians] had not ex-
amined him . . . and that their opinions were based on an incom-
plete record”—went only to weight, not to the necessity of cross-
examination.224  The court noted that the ALJ had stated that only
minor weight would be given these reports.  The court held that the
221. Id. at 1057 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 1057-58.
223. Id. at 1058 (citing Calvin v. Chater, 73 F.3d 87, 92 (6th Cir. 1996)).  The court
distinguished two cases, Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1976) and
Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1989), that required the issuance of subpoenas,
on the basis that they involved the introduction of reports post-hearing. Id. at 1058-59.
224. Id. at 1058.
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ALJ had not erred in denying the subpoenas.225  Thus, the issuance
of subpoenas is subject to a showing of need for truth-testing and
the party demanding the subpoenas bears the burden.
If the objector to the hearsay had an opportunity to use sub-
poena power to call or depose the declarant but failed to take it,
due process is not violated, at least where the hearsay appears to be
reliable.  In Bennett v. National Transportation Safety Board,226 the sub-
ject of disciplinary action over a near mid-air collision was told dur-
ing the week before the hearing that the principal witnesses, who
were flying the plane that was almost struck, would be unavailable
at the hearing because of vacation plans and that testimony in the
form of declarations would be submitted.  The court held that due
process was not denied by the admission of the hearsay declarations
at the hearing because the subject of the action did not use availa-
ble rules to subpoena attendance, seek depositions, or seek a con-
tinuance.227  In some cases, prehearing depositions themselves are
subject to a determination of the need for testing truth and a
weighing of the burden the depositions would impose.228
225. Id.
226. 66 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 1995).
227. Id. at 1137.  In Bennett, there was collaborating evidence, including air traffic
controller tapes containing exclamations of the witnesses at the time of the event, that
was consistent with their declarations. See also Valkering, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States
Dep’t of Agric., 48 F.3d 305, 308 (8th Cir. 1995) (no  deprivation of right of cross-
examination through admission of affidavits where affidavits were provided in advance
and objecting party could have requested order for deposition under regulations.).
228. The extent to which a party is constitutionally entitled to pre-hearing discovery
is also subject to the balancing tests.  In Kropat v. Federal Aviation Administration, 162 F.3d
129 (1998), an FAA employee was suspended without pay and demanded and received
an arbitration hearing.  He objected, however that he was denied pre-hearing discovery
in the form of deposing or interviewing the agency witnesses.  The court applied the
balancing test:
In order to determine whether due process is satisfied in a particular case,
we employ the familiar Mathews [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)]
test, in which we balance “the nature of the benefit or status of which the
individual is being deprived; the need for the government to act efficiently
and expeditiously in terminating this type of benefit or status; and the ex-
tent to which the decisionmaking process would be aided by the presence
of the procedural safeguard that the individual seeks.”
Id. at 132-33.
The court focused on the last of the factors, and noted that the employee had been
unable to explain how he had been realistically prejudiced by the denial of discovery,
particularly since he had been given the witnesses’ statements. Id. at 133.  Moreover, the
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If the party objecting to the hearsay asks to have the hearsay
declarant subpoenaed and there are reliability issues, it probably
would be error to refuse the subpoena if the cross-examination
would be critical to evaluating the evidence.  In a variation on Per-
ales,229 in Solis v. Schweiker,230 there was a difference in the opinions
of physicians in a hearing on a disability claim.  Three opinions
were for temporary work disability and the claimant’s treating physi-
cian’s opinion was for permanent work disability.  The ALJ then
sought a fifth opinion, based on the medical records and examina-
tion.  The fifth opinion was for no work disability.  The ALJ denied
the claimant’s request to cross-examine the testimony of the fifth
physician, allowing the claimant only to submit written interrogato-
ries.231  The ALJ denied the disability claim.232  The court of ap-
peals reversed.  The court recognized that cross-examination is
limited to that “required for a full and true disclosure of the facts”
and that the ALJ has discretion to determine when cross-examina-
tion is warranted.233  The court, however, rejected the argument
that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion, which had been made on
the grounds that Perales allows the use of an adverse written report
even in the absence of cross-examination.234  The court noted that
the Court in Perales had emphasized that the claimant had not
sought cross-examination.  The court also noted that here the re-
port on which cross-examination was sought was crucial to the ALJ’s
decision.  The court held that “where the physician is a crucial wit-
ness whose findings substantially contradict the other medical testi-
mony, the claimant has been denied procedural due process if his
request to subpoena the physician is not granted.”235
court noted that formal discovery can be burdensome and does not necessarily contrib-
ute to the accuracy of the final determination in the case. Id. at 133-34.
229. 402 U.S. 389.
230. 719 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1983).
231. Id. at 302.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 301.
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d. Burden on opponent of admission to raise
meaningful issue of need for cross-
examination on hearsay
The burden is on the opponent of hearsay evidence to show
that there are credible issues about the reliability of the evidence in
order to compel cross-examination, just as it is on the party de-
manding cross-examination of a witness at the hearing.236  This is
consistent with the posture of the opponent of admission being the
proponent of the argument that due process is violated.  In Veg-Mix,
Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture,237 the respondent ar-
gued that invoices admitted in the hearing against it did not meet
the requirement of the business records hearsay exception of FRE
Rule 803(6) in that the records were not supported by the testi-
mony of a custodian.  The court not only held that standards are
more lax for administrative proceedings, but that the burden is on
the opponent of admission of hearsay to raise a valid challenge to
the accuracy of the documents:
Veg-Mix stresses the agency’s purported technical error,
rather than the truthfulness of the invoices. . . . In the
absence of a serious, nonspeculative argument that the
records were something other than they appeared to be,
the practical standards applicable to administrative pro-
ceedings are not offended.238
Hearsay documents are admissible even if a witness does not
testify subject to cross-examination as to authenticity, at least where
there is no reasonable challenge to the authenticity of the docu-
236. See supra notes 195-197 and accompanying text.  The opponent must show that
the particular relevant part of the evidence affecting him or her is deficient; it is not
sufficient to show that non-relevant parts of a piece of evidence may not be accurate.
Anderson v. United States Dep’t of Transp., F.A.A., 827 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (general attack on attendance logs not sufficient if no successful attack on the
particular relevant entries).
237. 832 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
238. Id. at 606 (internal reference omitted). See also Anderson v. United States
Dep’t of Transp., F.A.A., 827 F.2d 1564, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (placing burden on op-
ponent of entries in attendance log to show that entries applying to the particular re-
spondent were inaccurate: “If the FAA had erroneously ‘updated’ an individual
petitioner’s T & A record, that person had the burden of bringing such error to the
attention of the FAA during its removal proceedings or at least to the attention of the
presiding official at the board hearings.”).
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ment, and in such circumstances, admission does not violate the
basic constitutional requirement that the use be “fundamentally
fair.”  In Bustos-Torres,239 discussed above, where an INS officer who
filled out a form was in another city, the court found an affidavit by
the officer about the form was sufficient for authenticity because
the validity of the contents was not challenged.240
The requirement that the opponent of admission of hearsay
raise a credible argument that it is unreliable avoids having a party
needlessly obstruct a fact finding hearing merely by raising an ob-
jection.  In Fairfield Scientific Corp. v. United States,241 a contractor
had his contract with the Navy terminated because of failure to de-
liver cartridges.  As part of showing that the fault was in the control
of the contractor, the government introduced a copy of a letter
from a supplier to the contractor setting out terms he had to meet
with the supplier, which he failed to meet, to enable him to satisfy
the Navy contract.  The contractor objected to the admission of the
letter because no witness testified to its authenticity.  The court up-
held the admission of the letter, noting that the rules governing the
hearing provided that the hearing shall be informal and that evi-
dence not ordinarily admissible under the rules of evidence may be
admitted.242  The court stated:  “Furthermore, it is settled generally
that an administrative tribunal is not required to exclude hearsay
evidence in the form of a document if its authenticity is sufficiently
239. 898 F.2d 1053.
240. Id. at 1056.  The court stated:
The affidavit of the examining officer shows that the information in the
Form I-213 is based upon statements of the petitioner, and the petitioner
does not contest their validity. In Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 724 (9th
Cir. 1980), the court held that the authenticity of a Form I-213 was suffi-
ciently established by the testimony of the examining officer, who identified
it as the form prepared by him when he questioned the alien. Here there
was no such testimony by the examining officer, but his affidavit to that
effect was introduced into evidence. Because the rules of evidence do not
apply in deportation hearings, the admission of this affidavit was not error,
for it is probative, and not fundamentally unfair.
Id. (emphasis added).
241. 611 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
242. Id. at 858-59.
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convincing to a reasonable mind and if it carries sufficient assurance as to
its truthfulness.”243
The court noted that the contents of the letter were corrobo-
rated by events that followed the letter and that no motive was sug-
gested as to why the supplier would falsify such a document.244  The
court concluded that “there was a reasonable basis for the board to
be assured of its genuineness so as to warrant its admission in evi-
dence.”245  Thus, a mere objection to admission is not sufficient;
the opponent must demonstrate that there are substantive grounds
for rejecting the evidence.246
B. APA Standards
Although the constitutional requirements have a broader role
in evidence standards in administrative proceedings than the APA
requirements in that they are more frequently referred to by review
courts under the “probative and fundamentally fair” test,247 the re-
quirements work together.  There are common concepts that make
for a largely coordinated whole.  Constitutional requirements on
use of hearsay include, as part of the due process balancing test,
evaluation of the “reliability and probative value” of the hearsay.248
Under the APA, decisions must be based on evidence that is reli-
able and probative.  The standard on judicial review of “substantial
243. Id. at 859 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, (1971); Pascal v. United
States, 543 F.2d 1284, 1289 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Reil v. United States, 456 F.2d 777, 780 (Ct.
Cl. 1972); N. Fiorito Co. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1284, 1295 (Ct. Cl. 1969); J. D.
Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 424, 427-28 (Ct. Cl. 1969)) (empha-
sis added).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. In Gallagher v. NTSB, 953 F.2d 1214 (10th Cir. 1992), the court rejected argu-
ments that because a blood sample vial was not sealed in a particular regular way, it
could not be authenticated.  The court cited testimony that it was sealed and shipped in
apparently good order.  There was no suggestion or evidence that the sample had been
tampered with.  The court concluded that one would have to make an assumption with-
out any evidentiary basis to reject the evidence that the vial had been tampered with
without any reason. The court rejected the objection.  This can be looked on as the
proper use of common sense in receiving evidence unless the opponent can develop
evidence of an irregularity.  It can also be looked at as saying that speculation about
defects in otherwise apparently reliable evidence is not a sound ground to decide about
evidence. Id. at 1218-19.
247. See supra notes 140-42. R
248. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402.
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evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”249  A reasonable mind
would accept reliable and probative evidence.
1. APA Factors
The application of the statutory requirements basically follows
the intent in the legislative history.  On admissibility the APA pro-
vides that “[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received.”250
It precludes, for purposes of not overburdening the record, only
“irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.”251  The es-
sential test for admissibility under the APA, then, is relevance and
materiality.252  Hearsay is admissible, like other evidence, if it meets
the relevance test.253  Some discretion as to admission of evidence is
reposed in the ALJ and the agency.254  Denying admission of evi-
dence which would constitute probative evidence can be a denial of
the moving party’s rights.255  Making timely objections to the admis-
sion of evidence is very important.  Generally, a failure to object to
the admission of evidence at the hearing precludes raising the ob-
249. Id. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
250. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
251. See, e.g., Bennett v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 1995); Gallagher v.
NTSB, 953 F.2d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 1992); Sorenson v. NTSB, 684 F.2d 683, 686
(10th Cir. 1982).
252. See, e.g., Evosevich v. Consol. Coal Co., 789 F. 2d  1021, 1025 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that admissible evidence is “constrained only by its relevancy”); Sorenson v.
NTSB, 684 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Under the Administrative Procedures Act
an agency need only exclude ‘irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence.’ 5
U.S.C. § 556(d).  Otherwise, any documentary or oral evidence may be received.”).
253. Bobo v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 52 F.3d 1406, 1414 (6th Cir. 1995);
Hoska v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 677 F.2d 131, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Pro-
vided it is relevant and material, hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings
generally and in adverse action proceedings in particular.”)
254. Underwood v. Elkay Mining, Inc., 105 F.3d 946, 950 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Accord-
ingly, we recognize that the APA grants ALJ’s broad discretion to exclude excessive
evidence which lacks significant probative value and, by implication, to limit examina-
tions, evaluations, and consultations by experts when such events will, in the ALJ’s judg-
ment, merely give rise to evidence so unduly repetitious as to be lacking in probative
value.”); Yaffe Iron & Metal Co., Inc. v. EPA, 774 F.2d 1008, 1016 (10th Cir. 1985)
(“[T]he EPA rules of procedure for administrative hearings give latitude to the presid-
ing officer in determining whether to exclude or admit evidence.”).
255. Nat’l Ass’n of Recycling Indus., Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 658 F.2d 816, 825
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding agency’s disregarding of probative hearsay evidence to be
arbitrary and capricious).
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jection on appeal.256  The exclusionary rule, by which unlawfully
obtained evidence is excluded from trial, is generally not applicable
to administrative proceedings.257
The standard for agency decisions is “reliable, probative and
substantial” evidence.258  Courts tend not to address this standard
in APA terms.  The explanation for this seems two-fold.  First, the
process of evaluating and weighing by a trier of fact to arrive at a
decision is somewhat subjective.259  Second, elements of “reliable,
probative, and substantial” tend to get discussed by reviewing
courts, accurately or inaccurately, in terms of constitutional due
process considerations or in terms of the “substantial evidence” ju-
dicial review standard.260
The standard of judicial review on evidence is well settled.261
Consistent with the legislative history and the determination in Uni-
256. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc., 998 F.2d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“To begin with, as the NLRB observes, Cal-Maine did not object to the two employees’
testimony on hearsay grounds at the administrative hearing.  Thus, their hearsay objec-
tion is waived.”).
257. The Supreme Court has long held that unconstitutionally obtained evidence
must be excluded in criminal cases to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in
the unconstitutional conduct.  Generally, this is not so in administrative proceedings.
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) the Supreme
Court held that “the exclusionary rule is . . . a judicially created means of deterring
illegal searches and seizures.” Id. at 363.  The Court stated that it “applies only in con-
texts ‘where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,’ United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976).” Id.  As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary rule is
“applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S., at 907 . . . Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials. Id.,
at 909; United States v. Janis, supra, at 447.” Id.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2004).
259. Even where there is occasional reference to agency determination of the req-
uisite quality of the evidence, it is usually oblique. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dep’t of
Transp., FAA, 827 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that hearsay may be
treated as substantial evidence if the “circumstances lend it credence”).
260. See supra notes 91-107 and 109-235 and accompanying text; infra notes 262-75 R
and accompanying text.
261. A decision can be reviewed on other grounds, including whether the decision
is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a)
(2004). See, e.g., R. P. Carbone Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 166 F.3d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the ALJ’s determination may be set aside if arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or contrary to law.  Under this standard, the court must consider whether
there has been a clear error in judgment.  As to facts: “The ALJ’s factual determinations
must be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
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versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,262 discussed above, the standard of re-
view for factual findings is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”263  This is
evidence that would be enough to sustain a jury verdict.264  In mak-
ing these determinations, the reviewing court must consider the
whole record, including that part that detracts from the conclusion
below.265  Speculation does not constitute substantial evidence.266
whole.”) (citation omitted).  This article is focused on the substantial evidence standard
of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
262. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text. R
263. Id. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See
also Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162-63 (1999) (quoting Universal Camera and
analyzing the court/agency review and court/court review); Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966); Valkering, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of
Agric., 48 F.3d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1995) (“substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’”) (citations
omitted).  The Court in Universal Camera did find that the APA required the considera-
tion of the whole record and the need, as found in the legislative history, to avoid
merely rubber stamping agency decisions. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying R
text. See also Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 162 (1999).
This standard differs from the admissibility standards. See Gallagher v. NTSB, 953
F.2d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 1992); Mikels v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 870 F. 2d
1407, 1409 (8th Cir. 1989); Williams v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573,
1579 (11th Cir. 1986); Yaffe Iron and Metal Company, Inc., 774 F.2d 1008, 1010 (10th
Cir. 1985).
264. Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966); Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 57, 66 (1966); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling &
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (evidence must be “enough to justify, if the trial
were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from
it is one of fact for the jury”) (citations omitted); NLRB v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc., 998
F.2d 1336, 1339 (5th Cir. 1993); Gallagher v. NTSB, 953 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (10th Cir.
1992); Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1404 (10th Cir. 1976).
265. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951); Gray v. United
States Dep’t of Agric., 39 F.3d 670, 675 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the “‘substantiality
of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole’”) (citation omitted);
NLRB v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc., 998 F.2d 1336, 1339 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A reviewing court
must consider the totality of evidence in the record, including ‘that which fairly detracts
from the [agency’s] decision.’” (quoting Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488)); Mikels v.
United States Dep’t of Labor, 870 F. 2d 1407, 1409 (8th Cir. 1989); Garcia v. Califano,
463 F. Supp. 1098, 1105 (E.D. Ill. 1979).
266. White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. 1999) (Where parent presented evi-
dence that a state court would not release a court-supervised fund in favor of disabled
minor in seeking social security disability benefits for the minor, it was speculation for
the agency to conclude that a different request to the state court would get the funds
released, and “[s]peculation is, of course, no substitute for evidence, and a decision
based on speculation is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 375); Garcia v.
Califano, 463 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (E.D. Ill. 1979).
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Corroboration, however, is helpful in determining whether hearsay
testimony is substantial evidence.267
The reviewing court must defer to the agency in significant
ways and not substitute itself for the agency.268  Thus, the reviewing
court must normally defer to the agency where credibility is the
issue.269  Credibility determinations will be upheld unless they are
267. R.P. Carbone Constr. Co., 166 F.3d at 815 (the statements of two workers and
a safety manager to inspector, set forth in hearsay testimony of inspector, corroborated
each other).  In Evosevich v. Consol. Coal Co., 789 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1986) the claimant
for black lung benefits asserted that the ALJ’s reliance on a written report of a physician
who had not examined him did not meet the factors in Perales.  The court held that the
ALJ used the report as corroboration for another report of an examining physician and
that because the report was otherwise by a competent physician, involved reasoned in-
terpretations, and was consistent with other reports, it was permissible to make limited
use of the report. Id. at 1027-28.  In NLRB v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc., 998 F.2d 1336 (5th
Cir. 1993), an employer claimed that only local eggs were processed at a plant, using
testimony of supervisors and records of shipping.  The ALJ, however, relied on a num-
ber of isolated bits of evidence, much of it hearsay, to rule against the employer. The
court of appeals upheld the ruling stating, “The agency’s decision was based on numer-
ous pieces of evidence that, in the aggregate, undoubtedly support its finding.” Id. at 1343
(emphasis added).  Even where corroborating evidence is ultimately not sufficient, its
particular role in a “substantial evidence” evaluation supports its admission.  The admis-
sion of hearsay by an ALJ allows the agency and reviewing court to assess the evidence.
See Crawford v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 50 F.3d 46, 48-50 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ALJ
allowed in veterinarian’s written reports as “probative hearsay,” but found that absent
corroboration they were insufficient to support case; the department reversed and
court upheld reversal because no credible challenge was made to the truthfulness of
the reports).
268. Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. at 618-21 (1966) (holding that the
review of fact finding in an agency decision is more like reviewing the actions of an-
other branch of the government and thus is more deferential than the review of the fact
finding of a lower court based on a “clearly erroneous” standard).
269. Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055-56 (7th Cir. 1999) (accepting ALJ’s de-
tailed reasons for disbelieving claimant, including that claimant (1) was vague  and eva-
sive in answering questions, (2) was hesitant and indefinite in describing his pain, and
(3) forced the ALJ to bring out claimant’s criminal past by questions).  The court stated
in Butera:
The ALJ’s credibility determination of Butera, based on these three factors,
is precisely the sort of determination that this Court has recognized is enti-
tled to particular deference as it “involve[s] intangible and unarticulable
elements which impress the ALJ, that unfortunately leave ‘no trace that can
be discerned in this or any other transcript.’” Edwards v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d
334, 338 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Kelly v. Sullivan, 890 F.2d 961, 964 (7th
Cir. 1989)).
Id. at 1055. See also NLRB v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc., 998 F.2d 1336,1339-40 (5th Cir.
1993) (“However, in determining whether the NLRB’s factual finding are warranted by
the record, this court will not ‘pass on the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evi-
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inherently incredible or patently unreasonable.270  If there is a dif-
ference between the hearing officer’s findings and those of the
agency, the hearing officer’s findings are considered part of the re-
cord and given “such probative force as [they] intrinsically com-
mand” in determining whether the agency decision is supported by
substantial evidence.271  Also, the reviewing court is not to reevalu-
ate the weight of the evidence to come to its own conclusion, but to
accept the findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole.272  Indeed, the fact that two inconsistent con-
clusions can be drawn from the same evidence does not cause a
rejection of the agency decision.273  The purpose of this restraint
on courts is to avoid having courts simply replicate the agency’s fact
finding role and displace the expertise that agencies bring to the
subject.274
2. Sequence of Application of Evidence Standards
Although the basic APA law is not complex, the sequence of
the application of standards appears to present a continuing chal-
lenge.  The sequence of the application of constitutional require-
ments is also a challenge.
dence.’  Indeed, where a case turns on witness credibility, this court will accord special
deference to the NLRB’s credibility findings and will overturn them ‘only in the most
unusual or circumstances.’”) (citations omitted); Gallagher v. NTSB, 953 F.2d 1214,
1217 (10th Cir. 1992); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 150 (9th Cir. 1980).
270. Marick v. CFTC, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 27535 (Table), (9th Cir. 1993).
271. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 495-97.
272. Illinois Cent. R.R., 385 U.S. at 57, 69 (“It is not for the court to strike down
conclusions that are reasonably drawn from the evidence and findings in the case.”);
Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-22 (1966); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d
1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999); Woolsey v. NTSB, 993 F.2d 516, 521, n.16 (5th Cir. 1993);
Nadiak v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir.1962) (“The function of a
reviewing Court is to accept the findings of fact made by the administrative body if
there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support those findings”); Gal-
lagher v. NTSB, 953 F.2d 1214, 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 1992); Yaffe Iron & Metal Co. v.
EPA, 774 F.2d 1008, 1014 (10th Cir. 1985).
273. Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. at 620; Gallagher v. NTSB, 953 F.2d at
1220; Mikels v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 870 F. 2d at 1409 (“Under this standard, if
the ALJ’s decision is consistent with the law and is supported by substantial evidence,
‘the ALJ’s determination is conclusive and it is immaterial that the facts permit  the
drawing of diverse inferences.’”) (citations omitted); Williams v. United States Dep’t of
Transp., 781 F.2d 173, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986); Yaffe Iron & Metal Co., Inc., 774 F.2d at
1010.
274. Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. at 620-21.
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a. The legislative sequence
An initial consideration is the sequence of evidentiary require-
ments contained in the APA.  The sequence has been described in
United States Steel Mining Co., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compen-
sation Programs, United States Department of Labor.275  In that case, a
widow seeking black lung benefits obtained a letter from a doctor
who opined, based on a review of the deceased husband’s medical
file, that it was “possible” that a condition qualifying for benefits was
a cause of death.276  Relying solely on that evidence, which was the
only medical evidence presented by the claimant, the ALJ and the
agency granted the benefits.277
On review, the court of appeals noted that a concept of broad
admissibility applies: “the Administrative Procedure Act provides
that in an administrative hearing, ‘the agency as a matter of policy
shall provide for the exclusion [, only] . . . irrelevant, immaterial, or
unduly repetitious evidence.’ 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).  We have con-
cluded that this provision empowers the ALJ to admit and consider
‘all relevant evidence, erring on the side of inclusion.’”278  The
court of appeals reasoned that an ALJ has the competence to prop-
erly interpret and weigh evidence, such that strict exclusionary
rules are unnecessary.  As such, the court of appeals limited the use
of exclusionary rules to issues of relevance.  Broad admissibility
does not end the evidence process under the APA.  As the court
noted, at the time of the decision the ALJ or the agency must rely
only on reliable, probative and substantial evidence:
But even though the more stringent exclusionary rules of
evidence, which are generally applicable to jury trials, are
not justified in agency proceedings, the agency process
nonetheless requires that the ALJ perform a gate keeping
function while assessing evidence to decide the merits of a claim.
To assure both a fairness in the process and an outcome
consistent with the underlying statutory scheme, the ALJ
has, under § 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the affirmative duty to qualify evidence as “reliable, pro-
275. 187 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 1999).
276. Id. at 387.
277. Id. 387-88.
278. Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
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bative, and substantial” before relying upon it to grant or
deny a claim. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).279
More specifically, on the sequence of admission and evaluation of
evidence, the court stated that:
in an agency proceeding[,] the gate keeping function to
evaluate evidence occurs when the evidence is considered
in decision making rather than when the evidence is ad-
mitted. Even though it arises later in the administrative
process than it does in jury trials, the ALJ’s duty to screen
evidence for reliability, probativeness, and substantiality
. . . ensures that final agency decisions will be based on
evidence of requisite quality and quantity” regardless of
the admission of evidence.280
The court did not take issue with the admissibility of the doctor’s
opinion, but did find that the opinion was not “reliable, probative,
and substantial” evidence because it was speculation that could not
establish by the preponderance of the evidence the required
fact.281  Since there was no other evidence, the agency determina-
tion was reversed.282
Such clarity of sequence is rare, and most opinions mix con-
cepts.283  Some reviewing courts “speak” in terms of admissibility
when they are really addressing whether the evidence meets the
substantial evidence review standard.284  Some courts have rolled
279. Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 389.
281. United Steel Mining Co., 187 F.3d at 390-91.
282. Id. at 391.
283. In some cases, the correct sequence is applied, even if not expressly articu-
lated. See, e.g., Crawford v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 50 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Hoska v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 677 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
284. The court in Evosevich noted the incorrect mixing of admission and review
standards:
The Supreme Court in Perales and this court in Republic Steel conflated the
questions whether medical reports were admissible and whether they could
constitute substantial evidence. Neither case doubts, however, that hearsay
evidence is freely admissible in administrative proceedings. See 402 U.S. at
400, 91 S. Ct. at 1426, 635 F.2d at 208. In fact, hearsay reports of non-
testifying doctors constituted all the medical evidence submitted to the ALJ
in this case, by both the claimant and the Company. The ALJ did not err in
admitting Dr. Kress’ report over Evosevich’s objection.
789 F.2d at 1025.
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admission, decision, and judicial review standards into one mixed
standard.285  The confusion is somewhat understandable.  The APA
is a result of legislative deconstruction and reconstruction of evi-
dence concepts, resulting in a somewhat unusual evidentiary crea-
ture.  But the express intent is to allow in all relevant evidence and
then screen it later.  This is in contrast to the FRE, which screens
restrictively what is admitted and then leaves the jury free to come
to a conclusion without further standards, other than a possible
finding by the judge that no reasonable jury could have come to
that conclusion.286
Another aspect of the different APA tests for admission, deci-
sion, and judicial review is that they share a reliance on what a rea-
sonable person would do at the different stages.  But because the
standard of what a reasonable person would do at the most de-
manding stage tends to be intuitively applied across all stages, con-
flation occurs.  Thus, if evidence does not meet the statutory
decisional standard of being “reliable” and “probative,” why should
it be admitted in the first place?  The argument supporting separate
consideration is that whether a particular piece of evidence is “reli-
able” and “probative” may depend largely on corroboration of
other evidence.287  This determination can best be made when the
evidence can be analyzed together — at the decisional level and
then at the judicial review level.  The “substantiality” of the evi-
dence standard for decision and judicial review, of course, is almost
always a matter of aggregating pieces of evidence and is not deter-
minable at the admission stage.
The exception to separate analysis at the admission stage and
the decisional stage occurs when a piece of evidence is offered but
is incapable of ever meeting the “reliable” or “probative” or “sub-
285. See, e.g., Gray v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 39 F.3d 670, 675-76 (6th Cir.
1994) (discussing admissibility, decisional, and review standard without distinguishing
them as different standards).
286. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50; 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2524 at 249-66 (Civ. 2d 1995).
287. United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 19 F.3d 816, 823 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“Thus hearsay is admissible, provided it is reliable. Hearsay statements may gain relia-
bility by corroborating one another or by including specific details.”) (citations omit-
ted); R. P. Carbone Construction Co., 166 F.3d at 819 (the statements of two workers and a
safety manager to inspector, set forth in hearsay testimony of inspector, corroborated
each other).
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stantial” decisional standard, either under statutory or due process
analysis.  In such clear cases, it may be appropriate to speak of the
evidence as being inadmissible.  This is because the evidence is so
inherently deficient that it can only be “irrelevant,” or “immaterial”
and therefore cannot meet the admission standards.288  Such treat-
ment should be rendered, however, only when the proponent can
make no reasonable argument about how the evidence can be con-
sidered reliable, probative, or substantial in connection with other
evidence.
b. The sequence with constitutional considerations
The analysis of the APA standard sequence has to be coordi-
nated with the due process constitutional considerations of whether
evidence, particularly hearsay evidence, requires cross-examination.
Cross-examination necessarily takes place during the hearing.
Since the cross-examination issue is determined in large part by
whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable that further testing is
not required, it tends to pull forward discussion of reliability and
probativeness to the admission period.  But contravailingly, the con-
stitutional evaluation is also influenced by corroboration and the
overall context, and these are best weighed at a later stage.  Thus, if
it is clear that the evidence either can or cannot be admitted with-
out cross-examination, the decision should be made at the time the
evidence is offered.  When the proponent reasonably argues that
corroboration and context will support admission without cross-ex-
amination, the evidence should be admitted and evaluated later by
the ALJ, agency, and reviewing court for both statutory and consti-
tutional compliance.
The sequence of applying the constitutional standards is fre-
quently confused. Calhoun v. Bailar289 is sometimes cited as a stan-
dard for admissibility of hearsay evidence.  A closer examination
reveals that the analysis in Calhoun mixes admissibility, due process,
288. Woolsey v. NTSB, 993 F.2d 516, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that authentic-
ity is needed to avoid evidence being irrelevant or immaterial, but finding that the
proof met even the FRE standard and so was properly admitted); Gallagher v. NTSB,
953 F.2d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 1992) (although allowing admission, acknowledged that
a “lower evidentiary standard does not completely obviate the necessity of proving by
competent evidence that real evidence is what it purports to be”).
289. 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1980).
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and judicial review standards.  In Calhoun, a supervisor at a Post Of-
fice facility was charged with falsification of mail volume records
and directing his subordinates to falsify records.290  The charges
were based on affidavits of several of his subordinates.  At the ad-
ministrative hearing on his dismissal the officer who took the affida-
vits testified that each of the affiants was advised of his or her
constitutional rights and was given an opportunity to review and
revise his or her affidavit before swearing to it.  The affidavits were
received into evidence.  The supervisor did not object to the admis-
sion and did not later move to strike the affidavits, arguing only as
to the weight to be given to them.  The affiants who averred that
they had falsified records at the respondent’s direction testified at
the hearing, apparently as the supervisor’s witnesses.  Each re-
nounced his or her affidavit in whole or in part at the hearing.
Some or all of the affiants refused to answer any questions on cross-
examination, apparently on self-incrimination grounds.  The only
other witness was an inspector who testified that he detected falsifi-
cation in records and provided statistical evidence in support of a
finding of falsification.  The inspector also testified that one of the
affiants who renounced his affidavit at the hearing had admitted to
him that he had reweighed mail at the supervisor’s request.  The
officer presiding at the administrative hearing found that the state-
ments made in the affidavits were more credible than the live testi-
mony of the affiants because of the witnesses’ refusal to testify on
cross-examination and because parts of the affidavits were corrobo-
rated by other evidence.291
On appeal, the supervisor argued that hearsay statements that
are contradicted by the declarant can never constitute substantial
evidence.  The court then engaged in an analysis that mixed con-
cepts of admissibility with concepts of constitutional due process
use of evidence.  The court noted that court rules of evidence do
not apply to restrict the receipt of evidence in administrative pro-
ceedings, particularly hearsay evidence.292  The court then stated a
test for hearsay evidence that has been frequently cited, often in the
admissibility context:
290. Id. at 147.
291. Id. at 148.
292. Id.
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Not only is there no administrative rule of automatic
exclusion for hearsay evidence, but the only limit to the
admissibility of hearsay evidence is that it bear satisfactory
indicia of reliability.  We have stated the test of admissibil-
ity as requiring that the hearsay be probative and its use
fundamentally fair.
Thus, it is not the hearsay nature per se of the prof-
fered evidence that is significant, it is its probative value,
reliability and the fairness of its use that are
determinative.293
The court used Perales,294 which allowed the use of hearsay reports
even when there was an objection and the only live testimony was
contrary to the reports, as an illustration of this analysis.295  The
court stated, “The Court rejected a rigid rule and held that the
proffered hearsay evidence could constitute substantial evidence.
In doing so, the Court explained that there could be no blanket
rejection of administrative reliance on hearsay evidence irrespective
of reliability and probative value.”296
The court in Calhoun did not discuss the meaning of “funda-
mentally fair” or “fairness of use.”  Nor did it discuss the relation-
ship of “probative value” or “reliability” to the fairness concept.
Although the court did not discuss the source of those require-
ments, they only make sense in terms of the balancing test for meet-
ing due process requirements, described above.297  The court’s
reference to Perales, which dealt with those arguments in constitu-
tional terms, confirms that meaning.298  A due process analysis, in
turn, explains the use of “probative value” and “reliability,” because,
as described above, part of the due process balancing process in-
cludes an assessment of whether further truth-testing by cross-exam-
ination is necessary.299  Hearsay evidence that has “probative value”
and is “reliable” in its own terms or in light of other, corroborating,
evidence does not require the additional step of further truth-test-
293. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
294. 402 U.S. at 390.
295. Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 149.
296. Id. (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 407-08).
297. See supra notes 109-142 and accompanying text. R
298. See supra notes 110-142 and accompanying text. R
299. See supra notes 143-208 and accompanying text. R
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ing by cross-examination.  Indeed, the Calhoun court cited a num-
ber of factors, as in Perales, that may be helpful in establishing
probative value and reliability, which tend to establish whether fur-
ther truth-testing is necessary.300
Another aspect of Calhoun that echoes confusion elsewhere is
when and how the tests of reliability and probative value are ap-
plied. Calhoun started its discussion by noting that the supervisor’s
objection on appeal was that hearsay contradicted by its maker can-
not constitute “substantial evidence.”301  This is the judicial review
standard.  The court proceeded from there to discuss admissibility
standards, noting that they are broader than court rules of evi-
dence, leading up to the reference to an assessment of the proba-
tive value, reliability and fairness of use.302  The court then moved
to speaking about the analysis in Perales on the use of hearsay as
“substantial evidence,” the judicial review standard again.303  The
court then began mixing admissibility and substantial evidence con-
cepts.304  Finally, the court directly discussed the procedural pro-
cess of applying the tests for probative value and reliability as an
admissibility issue.305  At the same time, the court clearly recog-
nized and discussed that judging the reliability, probative value, and
300. Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 149.  For the factors referred to in Perales, see supra note
140. R
301. Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 148.
302. Id. The court also referred to the fact that a sanction cannot be imposed ex-
cept in accordance with “reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” Id. This is the
statutory agency decisional standard.  The court did not refer to this requirement fur-
ther in the opinion.
303. Id. at 148-49.
304. Id. at 149 (“We too reject any per se rule that holds that hearsay can never be
substantial evidence. To constitute substantial evidence, hearsay declarations, like any
other evidence, must meet minimum criteria for admissibility — it must have probative
value and bear indicia of reliability.”).
305. Id.  “There remains only the question of the appropriate vehicle of application
of these factors.  As noted, hearsay evidence, once admitted, may be relied upon by the
agency in many circumstances.”  The court here ignores the requirement that regard-
less of what is admitted, a decision can be rendered only when “supported by and in
accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence,” 5 U.S.C. § 556(d),
even though this provision was earlier referred to in the opinion.  626 F.2d at 148.
The issue of how the tests should be applied was also somewhat complicated by the
fact that the supervisor did not object to the admission of the affidavits.  During the
discussion, the court stated the well-recognized precept that, “[s]uch a rule would also
comport with the general rule that hearsay admitted without objection is ordinarily
given its normal probative effect. See K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.05 at
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fairness of use is to a large extent dependent on the other evidence,
which might not be available to the trier of fact at the time the
evidence is offered.306  The court suggested that in light of this fact,
a motion to strike at the close of the evidence is the desirable way to
handle the admissibility issue.307
All of this analysis is somewhat tangled and does not provide
practical guidance.  If an admissibility ruling at the close of evi-
dence allows for a proper determination, as the court in Calhoun
suggested, is the party objecting to the admissible evidence re-
quired or permitted to wait until the close of evidence to voice ob-
jection?  If an objection is made at the time the evidence is offered,
as required in court, is the ALJ required to defer rulings to the
close of evidence?  If hearsay evidence is excluded either when in-
troduced or at the close of evidence, does this make it more diffi-
cult for an agency or reviewing court to determine whether the
evidence is sufficiently probative and reliable to meet decisional
and review standards when they take up deliberation?  All of these
questions go to the issue of the difference between admission and
use of evidence.  Although due process can be addressed at admis-
sion, its fundamental significance pertains to use.  That is, constitu-
tional rights are not offended by mere admission in a non-jury
setting; they are offended when an action is taken against an objec-
tor based on evidence that the objector has not had a reasonable
opportunity to test.  The reasonable approach would seem to be to
apply the due process test at the time of admission to exclude only
evidence that is so constitutionally deficient that there is no reason-
able way it can be made to meet due process.  Where evidence
might meet due process when considered in relation to other evi-
dence, the determination on admissibility can be delayed to the
close of evidence and be struck there if it clearly fails at that
point.308  Finally, if the evidence is not clearly excludable at the
275 n. 8; Cf. Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc. (9th Cir. 1960) 281 F.2d 543, 548. See
generally 79 A.L.R.2d 890.” Id. at 150.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. The party objecting to the evidence should make an objection when the evi-
dence is offered, however.  It would be unfair to the opposing party to allow an objec-
tion to be delayed until the close of the hearing because if evidence is offered and
admitted, that fact will influence the course of the rest of the hearing.  The objecting
party should make the objection when the evidence is offered and the ALJ can defer
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close of evidence, it should be left in the record for further deter-
mination at the time of decision.  Thus, the terminology in Calhoun
of “reliable,” “probative,” and “fundamentally fair” is consistent
with constitutional considerations applicable to hearsay, but the
timing of their application should vary depending on how clear the
issue is to any particular piece of evidence.
C. Role of the Federal Rules of Evidence
1. Role of the Federal Rules of Evidence Generally
Although the evidentiary exclusions of court rules of evidence
were deliberately abandoned in the formulation of the APA, there
are strong reasons to make use of the modern Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to assist in affirmatively determining what evidence should
be admitted.  First, the standards for the admission and use of evi-
dence under the APA and the Constitution have proven to be amor-
phous, particularly with respect to hearsay.  To the extent that the
FRE can establish at least what definitely should be admitted, it can
provide some certainty to, and rational support for, the admission.
Second, the court rules of evidence at the federal level were codi-
fied in 1975.309  This has made the rules easier to use and has pro-
moted uniformity.310  The codification of the rules generally has
been found to have been successful.311
It is universally recognized that the FRE do not restrict the ad-
mission of evidence in administrative proceedings.312  Thus, failure
ruling to the close of evidence where appropriate.  Although this can create a hardship
for the opposing party, at least the opposing party is alert to the risk of losing the
evidence.  The exception to this sequence is where the basis for the objection only
becomes apparent later, such as through the other party’s witnesses.
309. For a concise history of the codification of the rules of evidence, see STEPHEN
A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 2 (7th ed. 1997).
310. Id. at 5.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Bennett v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 1995) (“To begin with,
agencies are not bound by the strict rules of evidence governing jury trials . . . . [r]ather
the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 556(d)) renders admissible any ‘oral or
documentary evidence’ except ‘irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evi-
dence’”); Veg-Mix, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 606 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“Laxer standards of admissibility [than the FRE], however, apply to administra-
tive tribunals.”); Sorenson v. NTSB, 684 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1982) (“However,
agencies are not bound by the strict rules of evidence governing jury trials.”) (citations
omitted); Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 1066 (11th Cir. 1982) (“In
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to comply with the FRE is not a basis for excluding evidence.313
The most challenging problem in administering this broader ad-
mission standard under the APA standards is hearsay evidence.
Here, the FRE can provide valuable help.  The rules providing ex-
ceptions to the exclusion of hearsay represent development and re-
flection over a long period of time.314  More importantly, the basis
of the exceptions is the reliability of the hearsay.315  Reliability, in
turn, is the center of the due process analysis for the use of hearsay
in administrative proceedings, as described above.316
Thus, compliance with the FRE should satisfy due process re-
quirements in administrative proceedings.317  It would almost cer-
tainly be reversible error to exclude evidence that meets FRE
standards if the excluded evidence would have been material to the
decision.318  Constitutional case law is consistent with the FRE satis-
the interest of maintaining their autonomy, administrative agencies are not restricted to
rigid rules of evidence.”); Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1974)
(“Hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, which need not strictly follow
conventional evidence rules.”); Marlow v. INS, 457 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir. 1972)
(“The strict rules of evidence governing the admissibility of hearsay in judicial proceed-
ings are not applicable to administrative hearings.”); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 16.5 (1980).
This observation does not apply in those relatively rare situations where there are
statutory or regulatory requirements that the FRE be followed. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (NLRB proceedings “shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States. . . .”).
313. See Anderson v. United States Dep’t of Transp., FAA, 827 F.2d 1564, 1571-72
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
314. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (refering to “exceptions developed
over three centuries”); Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.) (noting hearsay rule and exceptions are “the product of careful elaboration and
critique”).
315. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s notes (“The present rule pro-
ceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may
possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction
of the declarant in person even though he may be available.”); Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft,
325 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating “[a]lthough the Federal Rules [of Evidence]
do not apply in this [administrative] case, exceptions set forth in the Rules focus on
trustworthiness . . . .”) (citing as examples Rules 803(6)-(8), 804(b)(3) and 807).
316. See supra notes 109-209 and accompanying text. R
317. See infra notes 319-350 and accompanying text.  Some agencies have imple-
mented regulations that provide expressly that evidence that meets the requirements of
the FRE is admissible. See, e.g., Rules for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation pro-
ceedings, 12 C.F.R. § 308.36.
318. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudi-
cations, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (stating that based on “sensible reasoning” and
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fying constitutional evidence considerations.  Significantly, in civil
case law, there are virtually no cases raising questions of constitu-
tional due process denial when the FRE are applied to a permit
admission of evidence in civil judicial proceedings.319  This indi-
cates that in civil actions, compliance with the FRE essentially pre-
cludes constitutional challenge on due process grounds.  In
criminal law, however, the relationship of the FRE to constitutional
requirements is a major recurring issue.320  The abundance of anal-
ysis in criminal cases is principally because the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment mandates confrontation of wit-
nesses against the accused in criminal proceedings.321  Significantly,
the propriety of evidence that meets FRE standards, it is right that an agency action
should be reversed for failing to admit such proper evidence) (citations omitted); Nat’l
Ass’n of Recycling Indus., Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 658 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(finding agency’s disregard of probative hearsay evidence to be arbitrary and capri-
cious); See Director Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Dep’t of
Labor v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1331 (3d Cir. 1987) (agency decisions can be re-
versed for improperly excluding evidence).
319. Even in the rare instance when FRE issues that sound in constitutional terms
come up, constitutional requirements are not discussed as such.  In Melville v. American
Home Assurance Co., the defendant objected to the admission of an FAA Airworthiness
Directive under FRE Rule 803(8) (public records and reports) because the report
should be considered an expert opinion and the defendant was denied a chance to
cross-examine under Rules 702 and 705. See Melville v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 443
F. Supp. 1064, 1110-15 (E.D. Pa. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir.
1978).  In denying the objection, the court commented on the relation of hearsay to
cross-examination:
Obviously, the hearsay and inability to cross-examine objections are closely
related, for one of the primary purposes for excluding hearsay evidence is
the inability to cross-examine the declarant. Under limited and carefully
controlled circumstances, however, some evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible as hearsay is expressly made admissible by the Federal Rules of
Evidence because of the inherent reliability of such evidence. See Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 803 (“The present rule proceeds upon the theory
that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduc-
tion of the declarant in person even though he may be available.”)
Id. at 1111 n.70.  The court, however, did not reference constitutional requirements in
resolving the issue, but addressed the issue as being solely a matter of reconciliation
between competing FRE rules.
320. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980) (listing extensive
commentary).
321. This express requirement does not apply to civil proceedings, including ad-
ministrative proceedings. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR303.txt unknown Seq: 73 28-APR-05 8:00
2005] STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 901
even with the heightened requirements in the criminal context, the
FRE hearsay exceptions usually pass constitutional muster.
For example, in Ohio v. Roberts,322 the Court addressed the use
at a criminal trial, under a state rule of evidence similar to FRE Rule
804(b)(1))(testimony at prior hearing of now unavailable witness),
of a transcript of the testimony of a now unavailable witness given at
the preliminary hearing in the case.  The Court held that the admis-
sion of such hearsay against an accused does not violate the Con-
frontation Clause.323  The Court noted that hearsay can be
admitted despite the Confrontation Clause only when it has such
trustworthiness that there is no departure from the reason for a
confrontation right.324  The Court observed that it had previously
held that hearsay must have “indicia of reliability” to overcome the
Confrontation Clause.325  The Court summarized that hearsay is ad-
missible “only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’  Reliability
can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other cases, the evi-
dence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”326  The court found that the hearsay
was properly admitted because the prior testimony had “indicia of
reliability” under the hearsay exception for testimony taken in a
prior hearing.327  The Court did not have to resort to a determina-
tion of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” of the particu-
lar testimony.328
322. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
323. Id. at 66.
324. Id. at 65.
325. Id. at 65-66.  The Court went on to say “[we have] applied this ‘indicia of
reliability’ requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them com-
ports with the “substance of the constitutional protection.”  This reflects the truism that
“hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values.” Id. at 66 (citations and footnote omitted).
326. Id. at 66.
327. Id. at 67-73.
328. Id. at 66, 72-73.  The state law at issue permitted the use of criminal prelimi-
nary hearing testimony when the declarant was unavailable at trial. Id. at 59.  The simi-
lar provision in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), imposes certain conditions on the use of prior
testimony, including an opportunity for cross-examination.
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Subsequently, in United States v. Inadi,329 the Court accepted
the co-conspirator exceptions from hearsay exclusion as providing a
basis for admission.330  The Court has held that other FRE hearsay
exceptions satisfy the Confrontation Clause in criminal cases.  For
example, in Idaho v. Wright331 the Court noted that the “excited
utterance,” “dying declaration,” and “medical treatment” excep-
tions to hearsay evidence exclusion satisfied the Confrontation
Clause requirements.332
In the most recent case on the subject, Crawford v. Washing-
ton,333 the Court revisited the requirements to satisfy the Confronta-
tion Clause in criminal cases in a ruling that tends to reduce the use
of hearsay in criminal trials in the specific form of pre-trial ex parte
testimonial statements.  These statements do not qualify as FRE
hearsay exceptions.  In Crawford, the defendant was convicted of
stabbing a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife.334  The defen-
dant’s wife had been present at the stabbing, but she was not availa-
ble to testify at trial because of the state’s marital privilege, which
bars a spouse from testifying without the other spouse’s consent.335
The trial court in Crawford admitted a taped police interview with
the defendant’s wife in which she described events at the time of
the stabbing.336  The court admitted the interview on the grounds
that it bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under
Ohio v. Roberts, not under a court evidence hearsay exception.337
The interview would not meet the FRE exclusion exception for
prior testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) because prior testimony is
admissible only if it is sworn and the defendant had an opportunity
and similar motive to conduct cross-examination.  After the defen-
dants’ conviction, the intermediate court of appeals reversed, find-
ing that the statement did not bear “particularized guarantees of
329. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
330. Id. at 395-96. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (This is technically an exclusion
from the definition of hearsay and not an exception to the application of the exclusion
rule).
331. 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990).
332. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2), 804(b)(2), and Rule 803(4), respectively.
333. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
334. Id. at 38.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 40-41.
337. Id. at 40.
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trustworthiness.”338  The state supreme court reversed the interme-
diate court, finding that the statement did bear “guarantees of
trustworthiness.”339
The Supreme Court noted that factual situations of the admis-
sion of hearsay in most Supreme Court precedent, including Ohio v.
Roberts, satisfied the Confrontation Clause requirements of cross-ex-
amination.340  The Court, however, rejected the generalized formu-
lation of a “reliability” exception for a particular category of
hearsay: “ex parte testimony,” i.e., statements made essentially as trial
witness testimony but outside of the trial cross-examination pro-
cess.341  The Court noted that various descriptions of these “testi-
monial” statements exist, including “‘ex parte in-court testimony, or
its functional equivalent – that is, material such as affidavits, custo-
dial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.’”342
Significantly, the Court excludes from the confrontation re-
quirement in criminal trials most situations that would qualify as
hearsay exceptions in the FRE.  Thus, the Court held that even “tes-
timonial” statements are admissible where the defendant had an
opportunity for cross-examination and the witness is unavailable at
trial, which is consistent with the prior testimony exception in the
FRE.343  The Court also permits the free use of prior testimonial
statements of a witness who appears at trial, presumably including
the admission of such hearsay as prior inconsistent statements of a
witness, as permitted under the FRE.344  It appears the Court also
apparently accepts such FRE prior statement exceptions as “dying
338. Id. at 41.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 56-59.  The Court noted that in Ohio v. Roberts there had been prior
cross-examination. Id. at 58.  The evidence rule used in Roberts as the basis for admis-
sion required opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 58. See also supra note 328.
341. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
342. Id. at 51.
343. Id. at 52-57, 59 n.9.  The Court also noted that the evidence outcome in Roberts
was consistent with this exception. Id. at 58. See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
344. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (“Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at
all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”). See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
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declarations” and probably “spontaneous declarations.”345  The
Court also permits common hearsay exceptions that it noted are
not “testimonial,” including statements in furtherance of a conspir-
acy and business records.346  Indeed, the Court seems willing to al-
low further hearsay exceptions development except for
“testimonial” statements where there was no prior opportunity for
cross-examination.347  What is excludible are ex parte hearsay trial-
type statements being used as a substitute for witnesses at a criminal
trial where there has been no opportunity for confrontation.  These
are statements not usually admissible under the FRE.  Thus, even
when the stringencies of the Confrontation Clause in its most re-
strictive interpretation are applied, hearsay that meets most of the
common exceptions in the FRE can be admitted even in criminal
actions.
Since exceptions to hearsay exclusion in the FRE generally sat-
isfy even the expressly more stringent constitutional requirements
applicable to criminal prosecutions, they satisfy the constitutional
requirements in administrative proceedings.348  That is, the admis-
345. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6, 58 n.8. See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2), 803(1),
(2).
346. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 (“Most of the hearsay exceptions [at the time of the
Sixth Amendment] covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial – for
example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.”). See also FED.
R. EVID.  803(6), 801(d)(2).
347. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development
of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such state-
ments from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”).
348. The relationship of constitutional compliance of the FRE to the propriety of
admitting evidence in administrative proceedings is illustrated in Felzcerek v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 75 F.3d 112, discussed above. See supra notes 199-205.  In
Felzcerek, where the court was dealing with documents that were public records under
Rule 803(8) or records of regularly conducted activity under Rule 803(6), the court was
confronted with the claim by an alien that he was denied due process in a deportation
hearing because of the admission of the records.  The records included a forged INS
letter, a DMV application by the alien with a DMV official’s handwritten notation that
the alien had submitted an “Immigration and Naturalization Letter” as proof of identifi-
cation, and a standard INS form filled out by the arresting INS agent describing the
circumstances of the alien’s arrest, including a statement that the alien had presented
an INS letter and claimed he received it in the mail.  The court recognized that the
DMV application with the official’s notations and the INS form were hearsay. Id. at 115.
The court had to determine whether, in light of the alien’s claim that his due process
rights were violated by not having the opportunity to cross-examine the authors of the
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sion of evidence in criminal trials that is in compliance with the
FRE is also “fundamentally fair” in administrative proceedings.349
The use of the FRE to determine what can be admitted has
valuable practical advantages.  It can help resolve issues in the most
difficult areas, hearsay and due process.  Its codified modern form
makes access and reference to it relatively easy.  The rules also pro-
vide accessible guidance in the form of accompanying comments by
the drafters that often explains the reasoning behind the rules.
Further, extensive case law interpretation is readily available
through linkage to a specifically identified rule.  All this makes it
easier to utilize the rules and to get more consistent and correct
determinations.  There is also a practical advantage to those prepar-
ing cases.  Reference to the FRE cannot tell those preparing to try a
proceeding all the evidence that will be admitted, because there is
evidence that is likely to be admitted even if it does not comply with
the FRE.  One preparing for a hearing, however, by reference to
the FRE, should be able to determine whether particular evidence
will be admitted.  This is of significant practical value to parties shap-
ing a case to be tried.  It also presents a structure around which
arguments on admission and reliance can be framed, as opposed to
a more amorphous standard that can cause misdirected argument
and ultimately cause determinations on admissibility to drift into
error or confusion.350  The FRE provide an established framework
to admit reliable evidence, to permit efficient trial preparation, and
documents, whether the use of the documents was “fundamentally fair” where “[i]n
the evidentiary context, fairness is closely related to the reliability and trustworthiness
of the evidence.” Id. at 115 (citations omitted).  The court stated that the Federal Rules
of Evidence “recognize the reliability and probative worth of public records by allowing
into evidence as exceptions to the hearsay rule” such records under Rule 803(8). Id. at
116.  The court also cited Rule 803(6) (records of regularly conducted activity) as an
exception to hearsay exclusion that also might apply to the DMV application. Id. at 116
n.3.  Over objections of lack of due process through lack of cross-examination, the
court recognized that evidence that meets FRE standards probably meets due process
standards.
349. Some agencies expressly make compliance with the FRE a ground for admis-
sion.  The rules of practice for hearings of the Office of the Comptroller expressly pro-
vide that evidence that complies with the FRE is admissible even though evidence that
does not meet the FRE may still be admissible. See 12 C.F.R. § 19.36(a) (2005).  The
rules for the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations are the
same. See 12 C.F.R. § 263.36 (2005) & 12 C.F.R. § 308.36 (2005).
350. 5 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 1101.02(6) (8th ed. 2004) (Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to administrative
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to take some of the vagaries out of determinations of what should
be admitted.
2. Federal Rules of Evidence Admission Tests
The FRE are helpful in several very common situations in ad-
ministrative proceedings, given the statutory scheme for broad ad-
missibility and the widespread use of reports, records, and prior
statements.  FRE standards on authenticity and hearsay are most
relevant.  The FRE not only establish what qualifies for admission
because that evidence almost always will satisfy any due process re-
quirements, but they also serve as guidance for what traits to look
for in evidence situations that may not actually meet the FRE, but
where the evidence has qualities that meet due process
requirements.
a. Authentication
Authentication of documents and other materials, i.e., that
they are what the proponent asserts they are, is required under
Rule 901 of the FRE.351  Certain methods of establishing authentic-
ity are set out in Rule 901.352  These standards can be helpful in
deciding what to look at to determine if a document has the proper
indicia of reliability.  Further, Rule 902 provides that certain docu-
ments do not have to be authenticated by extrinsic evidence.353
These include business records, if they meet certain conditions.
The authentication standards indicate what may properly be con-
sidered as authenticated without violation of due process.354
Even though the authenticity standard can be lower in admin-
istrative proceedings, the FRE standards are recognized as helpful
in determining the authenticity of documents for admission and
proceedings, but are often used as “a helpful guide to proper hearing practices” (quot-
ing Yanopoulos v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 796 F.2d 468 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
351. See FED. R. EVID. 901 (Requirement of Authentication or Identification).
352. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)-(10) (citing examples of ways to authenticate or
identify). For some administrative proceedings, rules on authenticity specify procedures
to expedite admission of documents. See, e.g., rules for controlled substances proceed-
ings, Drug Enforcement Administration, Dep’t of Justice, 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(c)
(2005).
353. See FED. R. EVID. 902(1)-(12) (citing documents and evidence which are self-
authenticating).
354. FED. R. EVID.  902(11).
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use in administrative proceedings.  In Woolsey v. National Transporta-
tion Safety Board,355 the central issue was whether the respondent
pilot was engaged in common carrier operations, for which he did
not have the appropriate licenses.  The government introduced,
through the testimony of investigators, advertisements in publica-
tions and written information received by customers of the pilot
tending to show that he was engaged in common carrier opera-
tions.  The materials were received into evidence.  The respondent
argued that the documents were not authenticated by witnesses
with personal knowledge and that he was thus denied a right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.  The court noted
that the FRE did not apply to administrative proceedings and that
the standards for authentication are “somewhat lower” than under
the FRE.  The court held, however, that there must be some show-
ing that the documents are what they are purported to be, other-
wise they would not be relevant or material and hence would be
excluded.356  The court rejected the respondent’s argument that
the authors of the materials had to be produced.  The court found
that the documents met even the FRE standards for authenticity.357
The court held that the advertisements in publications were self-
authenticating under Rule 902.358  It also held that the material re-
ceived from customers by investigators was authenticated by testi-
mony of the investigators of how they sought and received the
evidence, and that, consistent with the Advisory Notes to Rule 901,
that was sufficient knowledge of the authenticity of the docu-
ments.359  The court also rejected the claim that not having the cus-
tomers testify deprived him of confrontation and cross-examination
rights.360  The court noted that all but one of the cases cited by
respondent were criminal cases, which the court found inapposite
in this civil proceeding.361  The sole exception was Greene v. McEl-
roy,362 discussed above,363 which the court distinguished as involv-
355. 993 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1993).
356. Id. at 519-20.
357. Id. at 520.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Woolsey, 993 F.2d at 521.
362. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
363. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text. R
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR303.txt unknown Seq: 80 28-APR-05 8:00
908 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
ing a hearing where the administrative board was relying on secret
reports that were kept from the respondent, whereas here, the gov-
ernment presented open evidence and the pilot could confront the
investigators over the source of the documents.364
Failure to meet the FRE authenticity standard does not pre-
clude admission in an administrative proceeding if the authenticity
is not reasonably put in dispute by the opponent.  In Gallagher v.
NTSB,365 a vial of blood used for blood alcohol testing of a pilot was
not sealed by the normal security method before shipment to a test-
ing lab.  The respondent argued that because of this the govern-
ment could not establish authenticity under FRE Rule 901 and that
the sample could not constitute substantial evidence.  The court re-
jected the argument that evidence must be authenticated with the
precision of the FRE, although there must be enough shown about
the evidence to make it relevant and material for admission pur-
poses.366  The court observed that there was testimony about how
the vial was marked after the sample was drawn and how it was
packed and sealed for shipment to the laboratory.367  Since this
treatment was protective of the sample, the only way it could have
been corrupted was by deliberate tampering, and since there was
no suggestion or evidence of tampering, the court would not reject
the evidence on unreasonable mere speculation.368  Under this ap-
proach, consistent with the Benthamite common sense approach to
evidence in administrative proceedings, if affirmative evidence
shows a basis for a reasonable person to believe that a document or
real evidence is what it is purported to be, the party opposing the
admission must introduce some specific showing that challenges
that conclusion – and mere speculation will not be sufficient.369
364. Greene, 360 U.S. at 521.
365. 953 F.2d 1214 (10th Cir. 1992).
366. Id. at 1218.
367. Id. at 1218-19.
368. Id.
369. Anderson v. United States Dep’t of Transp., FAA, 827 F.2d 1564, 1570-71 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (holding that even as to imperfect documents, “generalized charges” of tam-
pering not sufficient to prevent admission and use).
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b. Hearsay
i. Non-hearsay: prior statements of party opponents;
prior inconsistent statement of a witness
The FRE do not exclude as hearsay prior statements of a party
opponent and prior inconsistent statements of any live witness.370
These forms of evidence may have the technical form of hearsay in
that they are out-of-court statements, but they are not defined as
hearsay in the FRE because the basic problem with hearsay, the un-
fairness of an inability to cross-examine the maker of the statement
is absent.  In both cases the maker is in the courtroom and available
to be cross-examined.  In the case of a prior inconsistent statement
of a witness, by definition the witness is on the stand at the hearing
and a party can attack the prior statement through examination of
the person who made it.371  In the case of prior statements of a
party opponent or his agents, if the statements were unreliable
when made, it is fair to let the party take the consequences and to
come forward and explain the statements.372  No due process issues
can be raised by an opponent of such statements, and they would
come in an administrative proceeding regardless of the FRE, assum-
370. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)-(2).  It is important to note that the prior inconsis-
tent statement comes into evidence without restriction as to the parties to which it ap-
plies.  That is, if a plaintiff moves for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement
and it is admitted in a multi-defendant proceedings, it can be used against all defen-
dants.  The prior statement of an opposing party, in contrast, comes in only against the
party who made the prior statement (“[t]he statement is offered against a party . . . .”).
Thus, if a plaintiff moves for the admission of a prior statement of a particular party in a
multi-defendant proceeding, the statement cannot be used against the other parties.
371. 4 STEPHEN A SALZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 801.02(3)(a) (8th Ed. 2001). See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note; 5 JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 801 App.01[2] (2d
ed. 2002).
372. 8 SALZBURG, supra note 371, at § 801.02 [2][b]; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 371, at § 801.30[1][a]. See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note.
Where the party opponent is an entity, the FRE provides that statements of employ-
ees of the entity are admissible only under certain circumstances.  NLRB v. Cal-Maine
Farms, Inc., 998 F.2d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir. 1993) (employees testified that their supervi-
sor made certain admissions during the course of their work; court cited FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(D) (admission of employer’s “agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment” in upholding admission in NLRB proceeding
where FRE applies to the extent practicable).
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ing the statements are not otherwise irrelevant, immaterial, or un-
duly repetitious.373
ii. Hearsay exceptions even when declarant is
available
The FRE provide for admission of some hearsay even if the
declarant is available to be called as a witness.374  The basis of these
exceptions is that the evidence is so inherently reliable there is no
need to call the person who originated the information, although a
party may need to call a person who can vouch for the method of
the recording of the information.  Thus public records (FRE Rule
803(8)) were admissible in Felzcerek,375 discussed above, and present
sense impressions and excited utterances (FRE Rule 803(1), (2))
were admissible in Bennett.376
Although compliance with the FRE provides for admission, fail-
ure to comply does not necessarily exclude hearsay evidence in ad-
ministrative proceedings even if a live witness is available.  In Veg-
Mix, Inc.,377 discussed above, the respondent objected to the use of
a batch of invoices because no custodian had testified as to the in-
voices as required for the business records hearsay exception of
FRE Rule 803(6) at that time.378  The court held that such techni-
373. As part of its exposition, the Court in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) held
that if a statement against penal interest is used against the defendant who made it, it
would “unquestionably” be admissible under longstanding principles. Id. at 127.  The
Court was presumably referring to the exemption from hearsay exclusion for admis-
sions by a party-opponent. Lilly was a state prosecution; the federal rule is FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2). See also Sorenson v. NTSB, 684 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1982); Marlowe v.
INS, 457 F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir. 1972) (upholding admission and use in deportation
hearing of alien registration form filled out by petitioner and a report of investigation
containing petitioner’s registration as a prostitute in Nevada was probative and use was
not fundamentally unfair so as to deprive petitioner of due process).  The items in
Marlowe would probably be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) as an admission of a party-
opponent — i.e., technically defined as non-hearsay for purposes of the exclusion of
hearsay in Rule 802.
374. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23) (citing hearsay exceptions even though declarant
is available as a witness).
375. 75 F.3d 112.
376. 66 F.3d 1130.
377. 832 F.2d 601.
378. Rule 803(6) now permits admission by certification under certain conditions
that are set forth in Rules 902(11) and 902(12).
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calities are not required, but rather the issue is relevance for admis-
sion, and then a question of weighing.379
Admissibility does not determine that the hearsay must be ac-
cepted as true or be given decisive weight in administrative pro-
ceedings.  In NLRB v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc.,380 the ALJ admitted
voluminous records of shipments of eggs, but they were accorded
little weight because they contained discrepancies and they were
records of the party offering them.381  In giving little weight to such
records, the court noted that the comments to FRE Rule 803(6)
discuss potential problems with business records and that it is per-
missible for the trier of fact to decide what weight should be given
to them.382
iii. Hearsay exceptions when declarant is
unavailable
Some hearsay is admitted only when a declarant is unavaila-
ble.383  The exceptions for such hearsay are made because there is
no other way to get the information, and the indicia of reliability,
while not as strong as for the exceptions when the declarant is avail-
able, are sufficient to meet due process standards.  The court in
Ortiz v. Eichler,384 without expressly referring to the FRE, held that
despite a regulatory requirement that claimants have an opportu-
nity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, testimony from a
prior court proceeding to which the claimant was a party and had
an opportunity to cross-examination was admissible.385  This is con-
sistent with FRE Rule 804(b)(1).386  In a somewhat looser situation,
379. 832 F.2d at 606.
380. 998 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1993).
381. Id. at 1342-43.
382. Id. at 1343.
383. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)-(6) (citing hearsay exceptions when witness is
unavailable).
384. 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
385. Id. at 895-96.
386. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (“Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at an-
other hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compli-
ance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.”).
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in Martin-Mendoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,387 an alien
appealing an order of deportation objected to the admission at his
deportation hearing of the statements given to an INS agent by an-
other alien in his group.388  The alien who made the statements
fled before the hearing and could not be found.389  The court
found the admission to be acceptable because of its probative value
and the fundamental fairness of its use.  The court noted that the
statement was sworn and verified and the declarant was unavaila-
ble.390  The court also noted that the statement would probably be
admissible in court under the FRE as they apply to unavailable
declarants.391
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Evidence standards in administrative proceedings are affected
by some basic conflicting considerations.  One is the conflict on the
scope of evidence that should be available: the advantage, as Jeremy
Bentham saw it, of allowing consideration of any information that
an ordinary person would want to have available when making a
decision about daily matters versus the disadvantage of allowing evi-
dence that may adversely affect persons without providing them a
full opportunity to test and prevent the use of some information.  A
second conflicting consideration is the cost of procedures: costly,
highly formal proceedings that provide the maximum protection to
respondents versus less formal proceedings that save costs and meet
practicality needs.  A third conflict is the discipline of determining
evidence matters: a broad, unspecified standard that provides
greater information but makes determination on evidence issues
less certain versus established judicial evidence standards that pro-
vide more structure but may exclude some useful evidence and re-
quire more formal technical knowledge.
387. 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974).
388. Id. at 921.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. (“Under Rule 804(a)(5) and (b)(4) of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for
the United Sates Courts and Magistrates, it would probably be admissible in a trial in
court.” Rule 804(b)(4) currently excepts statements of personal or family history from
hearsay exclusion).
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The drafters of the APA attempted to address some of these
conflicts by providing for very broad admission of evidence fol-
lowed by restrictions on the use of evidence in making decisions.
Reviewing courts tend to analyze evidence issues, principally as to
hearsay evidence, in constitutional terms.  This also involves con-
flicting considerations.  The constitutional test is based on an assess-
ment the need for cross-examination balanced with consideration
of the rights of the individual and needs of the government pro-
gram.  This is the “fundamental fairness” of the process test.
The application of these various tests produces uncertainty.
There are, however, some steps that can be followed to minimize
the uncertainty, particularly as to hearsay.  First, the initial review
on the admission of evidence should be based on whether the FRE
would allow admission.  That is, if the evidence meets the FRE re-
quirements and would be admissible in a civil judicial action, it sat-
isfies the constitutional standard of “fundamental fairness” in
Perales and elsewhere.  It should be admitted unless it is “irrelevant”
or “immaterial” under the APA admission standard.  To be used
subsequently as a basis for a decision, it must be determined to be
“reliable, probative, and substantial” under APA standards.
If the proffered evidence does not meet the FRE standards for
admissibility, then a constitutional test must be applied directly.
The evidentiary core of the test is an evaluation of whether further
testing would meaningfully add to the determination of trustworthi-
ness, i.e., an assessment of the “reliability and probative value” of
the evidence.  If further testing is not needed, due process is not
offended by its admission and use even if it does not satisfy the FRE.
Where a basis for inclusion or exclusion is not clear, a determina-
tion should be delayed to the end of the hearing or to a decision
because corroboration by other evidence can be important and
neither the APA nor the Constitution is offended by mere admis-
sion.  A further consideration is the availability or unavailability of
the maker of the hearsay.  If hearsay evidence is in the form of a
witness statement and the witness is freely available, the hearsay
may be declined.  If the witness of apparently reliable hearsay is not
available in a practical sense or the truth of the hearsay is not mean-
ingfully challenged, it can be admitted and used.  Also, the party
advancing a constitutional challenge to the admission or use of the
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proffered evidence bears the burden of raising a meaningful chal-
lenge that the evidence fails to meet the constitutional test if the
exclusion is not obvious.  This is because the constitutional objec-
tion is not premised on form, as with a FRE objection in court; it is
premised on the substantive issue of whether due process would be
denied by admission and use.  Thus, a simple objection by the op-
ponent of admission that the evidence does not meet FRE require-
ments or that he or she has not been able to cross-examine the
creator of the hearsay is not sufficient in itself to stop admission.
Finally, in close cases the evidence should be admitted because the
evidence will undergo a further evaluation of whether it is “reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence” before it can be used to sup-
port a decision.
In the end, the central issue is that administrative proceeding
evidence standards must be practical while also protecting basic
rights.  An understanding of the mechanisms, legislative and consti-
tutional, that help reconcile the different interests is essential.  Ap-
plying the FRE initially and then specific steps within the broader
constitutional test makes the task more manageable.
